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The malicious manipulation of quantum key distribution (QKD) hardware is a serious threat
to its security, as, typically, neither end users nor QKD manufacturers can validate the integrity
of every component of their QKD system in practice. One possible approach to re-establish the
security of QKD is to use a redundant number of devices. Following this idea, we introduce an
efficient distributed QKD post-processing protocol and prove its security in a variety of corruption
models of the possibly malicious devices. We find that, compared to the most conservative model of
active and collaborative corrupted devices, natural assumptions lead to a significant enhancement
of the secret key rate and considerably simpler QKD setups. Furthermore, we show that, for most
practical situations, the resulting finite-size secret key rate is similar to that of the standard scenario
assuming trusted devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution [1–4] (QKD) allows for
information-theoretically secure communications, unaf-
fected by the long-term security weakening inherent to
public-key cryptography [5, 6]. Its security relies on fun-
damental physical principles and various assumptions, a
crucial one being that the legitimate QKD users, say
Alice and Bob, hold honest devices that stick to the
QKD protocol and do not intentionally leak their pri-
vate information to an eavesdropper (Eve). However,
this strong assumption is probably unjustified, consider-
ing the amount of hardware and software Trojan horse
attacks (THAs) against conventional cryptographic sys-
tems reported in the last years [7–11]. After all, like-
wise conventional security hardware, QKD devices in-
corporate many sophisticated components typically pro-
vided by specialised companies, and neither QKD ven-
dors nor users are capable of validating the security of
all these components in practice [12]. However, a ma-
licious component can totally compromise the security
of QKD. Indeed, the fabrication process of QKD sys-
tems might provide Eve with plenty of opportunities to
meddle with the QKD hardware, including both the op-
tical equipment and the classical post-processing (CP)
units. Moreover, Eve could evade post-fabrication tests
by arranging attack triggers that depend on a sequence
of unlikely events [10, 13].
Remarkably, not even device-independent (DI) QKD
[14–18] can provide security against malicious devices, as
shown in [19]. It is the classical nature of the secret keys
that makes QKD systems vulnerable to classical hacking
in both the DI and the non-DI scenarios, because classical
keys are susceptible to copying.
A possible solution to foil malicious hardware and soft-
ware in QKD was recently presented in [20], and then ex-
perimentally demonstrated in [21]. The triggering idea is
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that it might be more difficult for Eve to corrupt various
devices than a single device, for example, if they originate
from different providers. Therefore, one can use a redun-
dant number of devices for both the raw key generation
and the post-processing of QKD. As shown in [20], under
the assumption that the number of devices controlled by
Eve is restricted, secure QKD is possible by combining
verifiable secret sharing (VSS) [22–26]—whose essential
building block is secret sharing (SS) [27, 28], a standard
technique in secure hardware design [29]— and privacy
amplification (PA) [30, 31]. To be precise, VSS (PA)
allows to protect a QKD system against malicious CP
units (optical apparatuses, such as QKD transmitters or
detection modules).
However, the analysis in [20] is restricted to the prob-
ably over-conservative scenario where all the corrupted
devices are active and collaborative. What is more, an
evaluation of the performance of QKD in the presence
of corrupted devices is missing. To cope with these lim-
itations, in this work we present an efficient distributed
QKD post-processing scheme tailored for a setting with
corrupted devices, and prove its security in a variety of
eavesdropping models. For this purpose, we introduce
a suitable cryptographic primitive weaker than standard
VSS, which we refer to as conditional VSS. In addition,
we combine our post-processing protocol with well-known
QKD schemes to evaluate the resulting secret key rate.
We find that, compared to the conservative scenario con-
sidered in [20], some eavesdropping models of practical
relevance enable a significant enhancement of the secret
key rate, while requiring fewer honest devices and classi-
cal communications. Moreover, for practical data block-
sizes and moderate numbers of corrupted devices, our
results show that the increased authentication cost of
our scheme (compared to that of standard QKD post-
processing) is negligible with respect to the extractable
secret key length.
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2II. RESULTS
We start by describing the general formalism we con-
sider. Without loss of generality, a standard QKD setup
can be divided into two parts with separate roles: a QKD
module and a classical post-processing (CP) unit. Alice’s
and Bob’s QKD modules form a so-called QKD pair,
whose role is to generate raw correlated data between
the parties via quantum communication. Each module
transfers its raw data to its local CP unit, and the two
distant CP units distill a pair of secret keys from the
raw data via coordinated classical post-processing and
authenticated classical communication.
The focus of this work is the general scenario where
not all the devices are trusted, thus forcing the parties to
use a redundant number of them [20]. Throughout the
paper, we shall assume that Alice and Bob share nq QKD
pairs (or simply “pairs”), and that each of them holds nc
CP units (or simply “units”). Nevertheless, our results
could be trivially adapted to the case where each party
has a different number of units. For j = 1, . . . , nq, Alice’s
(Bob’s) module QKDAj (QKDBj ) is connected to all her
(his) units {CPAl}ncl=1 ({CPBl′}ncl′=1) via secure channels,
i.e., channels that provide both privacy and authenti-
cation. Also, all of Alice’s (Bob’s) units are pairwise
connected by secure channels too. Since all these links
take place within Alice’s (Bob’s) lab, in practice secu-
rity could be enforced by using, say, physically protected
cables. Similarly, the CPAl are connected to the CPBl′
by authenticated classical channels. And lastly, as usual,
a quantum channel fully accessible to an eavesdropper
links QKDAj to its partner QKDBj . A schematic of this
QKD setup is given in Fig. 1.
A. Active collaborative eavesdroppers
It was shown in [20] that the setting above—consisting
of multiple QKD pairs and multiple CP units—allows for
secure QKD in the presence of a restricted number of cor-
rupted devices, even under the conservative assumption
that all of them fully obey a single Eve who can access
their internal information and make them arbitrarily mis-
behave from the protocol. We refer to this scenario as the
active collaborative (AC) model. More precisely, Eve is
treated here as a so-called threshold active adversary [26].
This approach amounts to assuming that she can corrupt
up to, say tq QKD pairs (a QKD pair is said to be cor-
rupted when at least one of its modules is), and up to
tc CP units per lab. The solution presented in [20] to
achieve secure QKD in the AC model is based on com-
bining PA with VSS. On the one hand, PA is required
to remove not only the information Eve gains through
her intervention in the quantum channel (as it is done
in standard QKD post-processing), but also the informa-
tion she learns from the corrupted QKD pairs, which is
possible as long as nq > tq. On the other hand, VSS
enables an honest QKD module to split a raw key into
FIG. 1: Proposal of a secure QKD setup with possibly
malicious devices due to [20]. The areas surrounded by
dashed lines define Alice’s and Bob’s labs. Alice’s
(Bob’s) lab contains nq QKD modules (yellow boxes).
Each module of Alice is linked to a single module of
Bob through a quantum channel (dashed blue lines),
forming a so-called QKD pair, and tq pairs are possibly
malicious at most. In addition, Alice (Bob) holds nc CP
units (grey boxes), tc of them being possibly malicious
at most. In each lab, all the CP units are connected to
each other and to all nq local QKD modules via secure
channels that provide both privacy and authentication
(black solid arrows). Also, every unit of Alice is linked
to every unit of Bob through an authenticated classical
channel (all of them together symbolised by the red
double-end arrow). It is shown in [20] that, as long as
nq > tq and nc > 3tc, this setting allows for secure
QKD even if one assumes that all the potentially
malicious devices obey a single eavesdropper who can
access their internal information and make them
arbitrarily deviate from the protocol. The reader is
referred to the main text for more details.
shares and redundantly distribute them among its nc lo-
cal CP units, in such a way that no group of at most
tc units can collaborate to reconstruct the key (privacy).
In order to perform linear local operations on the key
(i.e., the ones typically required by the post-processing
of QKD), the units individually apply these operations
on their shares, and the final output can be reconstructed
from its shares due to linearity. In any such operation,
VSS guarantees that all honest units can reconstruct a
common output as long as nc > 3tc [26] (commitment),
which indeed is the correct output if the QKD module is
honest (correctness).
Due to the use of standard VSS, the proposal in [20]
is resilient to the misbehaving of the CP units at the
price of relying on the availability of a possibly simulated
broadcast channel [32], a very stringent requirement in
practice. Here, we devise a general post-processing pro-
tocol that replaces standard VSS by conditional VSS (de-
fined in Sec. IV), which circumvents broadcast by con-
templating the possibility of aborting. After all, abortion
is an ultimately unavoidable feature of QKD due to the
unrestricted access that Eve has to the quantum chan-
nel. Precisely, in a conditional VSS scheme, commitment
3(correctness) is only guaranteed upon non-abortion of the
scheme.
Also, one drawback of the proposal in [20] is that its
implementation is rather cumbersome, as it requires the
execution of nq + 1 separate PA steps. Instead, our pro-
tocol implements PA in a single step. In addition, it
minimises the classical communication between labs to
reduce the extra authentication cost provoked by the use
of multiple devices.
1. QKD post-processing protocol
Prior to the QKD session, Alice and Bob agree on the
number tq ≥ 0 (tc ≥ 0) of corrupted QKD pairs (CP
units per lab) they want to be protected against, which
forces them to hold nq = tq + 1 QKD pairs (nc = 3tc + 1
CP units per lab) at least in the AC model under consid-
eration. Similarly, they agree on a correctness (secrecy)
parameter, cor (sec), and a total authentication error
satisfying AU < cor and AU < sec.
For j = 1, . . . , nq, the pair (QKDAj ,QKDBj ) runs a
QKD session to generate the basis Z raw key strings,
(rjA, r
j
B), to be kept private, and some non-private
protocol information, (infojA, info
j
B), typically including
the basis and intensity settings, detection events, etc.
Crucially, (infojA, info
j
B) includes all the raw key material
required for parameter estimation. The post-processing
protocol starts next and is described below. Although
the description assumes that the possibly corrupted
devices do not deviate from the protocol, the protocol
is indeed secure against active eavesdroppers, as proven
later. Finally, although not explicitly stated, in case of
abortion, the aborting party must notify the other party.
Protocol. Let us focus on, say, the j-th QKD pair.
1. Distribution of data. QKDAj (QKDBj ) dis-
tributes shares of its raw key rjA (r
j
B) among the
CPAl following the Share protocol of a conditional
VSS scheme (see Sec. IV). We denote the set of
units that receive the i-th share of rjA (r
j
B) by σ
A
i
(σBi ), which without loss of generality is common
for all j = 1, . . . , nq. In addition, QKDAj (QKDBj )
sends the protocol information infojA (info
j
B) to all
CPAl ∈ σA1 (CPBl′ ∈ σB1 ), and the latter perform a
consistency test on this data: they pairwise check
that their copies of infojA (info
j
B) match via authen-
ticated channels. If a CPAl (CPBl′ ) finds an in-
consistency, she aborts the protocol (see the Share
protocol in the Methods section for the two-step
abortion procedure we consider).
2. Sifting. Each CPAl ∈ σA1 sends its copy of infojA
to all CPBl′ ∈ σB1 , which individually apply major-
ity voting (MV) to decide on a single copy. Then,
the CPBl′ ∈ σB1 forward some sifting information,
siftj , computable from the pair (infojA, info
j
B), to
the CPBl′ /∈ σB1 , which apply MV too. Using
siftj , every CPBl′ discards some key bits from their
shares of rjB to obtain shares of the sifted key, s
j
B.
Alternative sifting schemes that require to discard
random subsets of the data could easily be adapted
by including a random bit string (RBS) generation
protocol (see Sec. IV).
3. Parameter estimation. Using (infojA, info
j
B),
each CPBl′ ∈ σB1 computes a hypothetical lower
bound hjε (see the Supplementary Information for
the details) on the ε-smooth min-entropy of sjB con-
ditioned on the information held by an eavesdrop-
per up to the parameter estimation (PE) step, for
a pre-agreed ε determined by sec.
Once steps 1 to 3 are implemented for j = 1, . . . nq, all
CPBl′ construct their shares of the concatenated sifted
key sB = [s
1
B, . . . , s
nq
B ], such that the k-th share of sB is
simply given by the concatenation of the k-th share of
s1B, the k-th share of s
2
B, and so on. In addition, from all
nq hypothetical values h
j
ε, every CPBl′ ∈ σB1 computes a
lower bound l on the secret key length extractable from
sB via PA (see Sec. III for the explicit formula of l). If
a CPBl′ ∈ σB1 finds l ≤ 0, it aborts the protocol. Other-
wise, the post-processing proceeds as follows.
4. RBS generation. Every CPBl′ ∈ σB1 forwards l
to the CPBl′ /∈ σB1 , which apply MV. All CPBl′
perform a RBS generation protocol to select two
random 2-universal hash functions, hEV and hPA,
respectively devoted to error verification (EV) and
PA.
5. Information reconciliation. Every CPBl′ com-
putes its shares of the string of concatenated syn-
dromes, syB = [sy(s
1
B), . . . , sy(s
nq
B )], and the EV
tag hEV,B = hEV(sB). Here, sy(·) is a linear func-
tion specified by an error correction (EC) protocol
for a pre-agreed quantum bit error rate (QBER).
All together, the CPBl′ reconstruct syB and hEV,B
via the Reconstruct protocol of a conditional VSS
scheme (see Sec. IV). Each CPBl′ ∈ σB1 sends the
following items to every CPAl ∈ σA1 :
(a) The total sifting information, {siftj}nqj=1.
(b) The syndrome information, syB, a description
of hEV and the EV tag, hEV,B.
(c) A description of hPA.
For all 3 items, each CPAl ∈ σA1 applies MV to de-
cide on a single copy. Then, it forwards {siftj}nqj=1,
hEV and hPA to the CPAl /∈ σA1 (which apply MV
too), and every CPAl sifts its shares of the raw
keys rjA to obtain shares of the concatenated sifted
key sA = [s
1
A, · · · , snqA ]. Following the EC protocol,
all CPAl compute their shares of the concatenated
syndrome string, syA = [sy(s
1
A), . . . , sy(s
nq
A )], and
4jointly reconstruct it via the Reconstruct protocol
of a conditional VSS scheme. From syB and syA,
each CPAl ∈ σA1 computes the error pattern eˆ and
updates its copy of the first share of sA by XOR-
ing it with eˆ. Thus, by construction, Alice’s cor-
rected key is sˆA = sA ⊕ eˆ, “⊕” denoting bitwise
XOR. Then, all CPAl compute their shares of the
EV tag hEV,A = hEV(sˆA) and jointly reconstruct it
via the Reconstruct protocol of a conditional VSS
scheme. Finally, every CPAl ∈ σA1 checks that
hEV,A = hEV,B. Otherwise, it aborts the protocol.
6. Privacy amplification. In case of not aborting,
every CPAl (CPBl′ ) computes its shares of the final
key kA = hPA(sˆA) (kB = hPA(sB)).
From steps 1 to 6, and given that nq > tq and nc > 3tc,
the following security claim holds irrespectively of the
misbehaving of the corrupted devices.
Claim. Suppose that Protocol does not abort. Then,
Alice and Bob can unambiguously determine unique
cor-correct and sec-secret final keys.
Importantly, the determination of such final keys by
Alice and Bob can be done by simply applying MV on
the key shares held by their respective CP units, followed
by an XOR operation. More generally, in the presence
of untrusted units, the CPAl (CPBl′ ) can forward their
final shares to a local key management layer [33, 34].
There, they could be stored in distributed memories or
employed for applications such as message encryption,
which in turn can be performed share-wise too in the
presence of untrusted devices.
A proof of the claim based on the properties of condi-
tional VSS and PA is given in the Supplementary Infor-
mation. In particular, it is shown there that the secret
key length extractable via Protocol is given by
l =
⌊
min
j
{
hjε −
∣∣sy(sjB)∣∣}− log2( 1ˆcor2PAδ
)⌋
, (1)
where j = 1, . . . , nq, ε and h
j
ε were introduced in the PE
step, |sy(sjB)∣∣ is the number of bits in sy(sjB), ˆcor =
cor − AU, PA is the error probability of PA, and δ > 0.
In addition, the overall secrecy parameter is given by
sec ≥ 2ε+ δ + PA + AU, (2)
where we recall that the total authentication error, AU,
is selected a priori by Alice and Bob.
Let lAU denote the number of secret bits consumed for
authentication during Protocol (quantified in the next
section). Then, the secret key rate reads
K =
l − lAU
nqN
, (3)
where N stands for the total number of transmission
rounds per QKD pair. As discussed next, the authen-
tication cost of a message scales logarithmically with
its length, meaning that for most practical situations
lAU << l and thus K ≈ l/(nqN) (see Sec. III).
2. Authentication
Here, we quantify the amount of secret bits that Pro-
tocol consumes for the authentication of the classical
communications between labs. This task requires every
CPAl ∈ σA1 to pre-share a so-called key pool of secret bits
with every CPBl′ ∈ σB1 . Assuming a pre-fixed size |k|
for all the key pools and recalling that both σA1 and σ
B
1
contain 2tc + 1 CP units, the overall authentication cost
reads
lAU = R
2 × |k| (4)
bits, where we defined R = |σA1 | = |σB1 |. Indeed, R is the
common size of all σAi (σ
B
i ). If, for instance, we follow the
scheme based on Toeplitz matrices described in [35] (see
the Supplementary Information), the authentication of a
message m (containing |m| bits) with an error probability
γ consumes dlog2 (2|m|/γ)e bits of the corresponding key
pool.
According to Protocol, the sifting step requires the
authentication of nq messages from Alice to Bob, say
{mjA}nqj=1 with mjA = infojA, and the information recon-
ciliation step requires the authentication of a single mes-
sage from Bob to Alice, say mB (consisting of various
items). Therefore, although {∣∣mjA∣∣}nqj=1 and |mB| are not
known a priori, it is required that
|k| ≥
nq∑
j=1
⌈
log2
(
2
∣∣mjA∣∣
γAU
)⌉
+
⌈
log2
(
2|mB|
γAU
)⌉
(5)
secret bits, setting a common error probability, γAU, for
every communication. In fact, since only an authentica-
tion error between two honest units may compromise the
security, we find that γAU and AU must be related as
AU ≥ (tc + 1)2(nq + 1)γAU. (6)
Finally, note that authentication errors may compromise
both the secrecy and the correctness of the final keys due
to the possibility that a malicious unit impersonates an
honest one. Thus, AU contributes to both sec and cor.
B. Alternative corruption models
The previous section considers the most conservative
adversarial scenario, that is, the AC model. However,
there might be situations where this model is over-
conservative. For instance, if Alice and Bob purchase
devices from different vendors, it might be reasonable to
expect that, even if they are corrupted, they do not col-
laborate, meaning that they do not share their private
information with each other or cooperate in any way.
5Also, if the information delivered by a certain device is
different from the one prescribed by the protocol, it might
be detected by Alice and Bob a posteriori. In this sense,
some QKD users might only request security against pas-
sive (rather than active) corrupted devices, which follow
the protocol prescriptions but covertly leak their internal
information to an eavesdropper. For example, this might
happen due to the existence of a side-channel that leaks
information to Eve from an honest device.
In this section, we analyse a wide spectrum of such
alternative corruption models to investigate their advan-
tages in terms of secret key rate and necessary resources.
Due to its generality, Protocol can be directly applied
to all the models we consider, such that distinct models
simply determine different protocol settings, compared to
the AC scenario. Importantly, we decouple the analysis
of the different corruption models for the QKD modules
and the CP units, i.e., the results we present for the mod-
ules do not assume a specific model for the units and vice
versa. For conciseness though, we restrict the analysis to
the non-mixed corruption models where all the malicious
devices of each kind belong to the same model.
1. QKD modules
The privacy of conditional VSS guarantees that the
secret key length extractable via Protocol does not de-
pend on the corruption model of the CP units, but only
on that of the QKD pairs. In particular, compared to
the AC model, three looser non-mixed corruption mod-
els exist: passive and collaborative (PC), active and non-
collaborative (AN) and passive and non-collaborative
(PN). Also, note that non-collaboration is obviously only
defined for tq > 1. In what follows, we show that only
the PN model allows to enhance the secret key rate.
As long as the malicious QKD pairs are collaborative,
an omniscient Eve could learn all the information they
hold about the keys, and as long as they are active, they
can deliver untrustworthy protocol information unsuit-
able for correct PE. Hence, although for different reasons,
the intermediate scenarios PC and AN cannot lead to an
enhancement of the secret key length with respect to the
AC model: they require to remove all the key material
that comes from corrupted QKD pairs via PA, thus also
demanding nq > tq. In particular, it can be shown that
the extractable key length for nq = tq +1 in the PC (AN)
corruption model is given by Eq. (1) too.
In the PN corruption model, one assumes an indepen-
dent Eve per malicious QKD pair who does not collabo-
rate with the eavesdroppers possibly controlling the other
pairs. Moreover, passivity implies that corrupted pairs
deliver trustworthy protocol information which allows to
quantify the ignorance (in secret bits) that the Eves pos-
sibly corrupting other pairs have about their raw data.
In this case, it suffices to remove the information held by
the most knowledgeable eavesdropper via PA in order to
provide security against all of them. As a consequence,
secure QKD is possible even if all the QKD pairs are cor-
rupted in the PN model. Setting nq = tq, the secret key
length l extractable via Protocol in the PN model (see
Appendix D in the Supplementary Information) is given
by
l =
⌊
min
v
nq∑
j 6=v
{
Hεmin(s
j
B|Ev)−
∣∣sy(sjB)∣∣}
− log2
(
1
ˆcor2PAδ
nq−1
)⌋
, (7)
which obviously leads to a greater secret key rate via
Eq. (3) than Eq. (1) for any given tq > 1 (we recall that
non-collaboration is only defined in this case). Note that
all the parameters in Eq. (7) are defined in Eq. (1), ex-
cept from Ev. This quantity stands for the information
held by the v-th eavesdropper, i.e., the one that corrupts
the v-th QKD pair, where v = 1, . . . , nq. Also, we re-
mark that no distinction is made between the bounds hjε
computed by the CPBl′ ∈ σB1 in the PE step of Protocol
and the actual bounds on Hεmin(s
j
B|Ev) in Eq. (7). This is
so because, by assumption, hjε certainly is a lower bound
on Hεmin(s
j
B|Ev) for all v 6= j in the PN model.
The secrecy parameter attached to l is
sec ≥ (nq − 1)(2ε+ δ) + PA + AU. (8)
As a final remark, we note that, although an enhance-
ment of the secret key rate is only achievable in the PN
model, both passive models (PN and PC) allow for a
straightforward simplification of Protocol. Namely, one
can remove all the consistency tests in step 1, irrespec-
tively of the corruption model of the CP units.
2. CP units
Although the corruption model of the CP units does
not affect the extractable key length, l, it determines the
necessary resources to securely implement Protocol: the
number of units per party, nc, the size of all sets σ
A
i
and σBi , R, and the total number of key shares man-
aged per CP unit, say r. On the one hand, nc and R
determine the necessary classical communications (both
between labs and inside each lab), and the total authen-
tication cost, lAU. On the other hand, r strongly affects
the post-processing time, a usual concern in the perfor-
mance of QKD.
In Table 1 we list the minimum values of nc, R and
r required to implement Protocol within each corruption
model of the CP units. The entries of the table follow
from the requirements of our conditional VSS scheme in
each case, and they are derived in Appendix D of the
Supplementary Information. As we observe, all the re-
stricted models allow to reduce nc, R and r with respect
to the AC model. For instance, note that the number r
of shares per unit grows exponentially with nc for a fixed
6nc, R, r active passive
collaborative
nc = 3tc + 1
R = 2tc + 1
r =
(
nc−1
tc
) nc = tc + 1R = 1
r = 1
non-collaborative
nc = 2tc + 2
R = 2tc + 1
r = nc − 1
nc = 2
R = 1
r = 1
TABLE I: Minimum number of CP units, nc, size of the
sets σAi and σ
B
i , R, and number of key shares managed
per CP unit, r, required to guarantee the security of
Protocol for every non-mixed corruption model. The
number tc of possibly corrupted units per lab is at least
two for the non-collaborative models (AN and PN), as
non-collaboration is only defined in this case.
fraction of corrupted units in the AC model. This might
lead to prohibitively long post-processing times even for
small values of nc. Nevertheless, this problem disappears
if one assumes that the possibly corrupted units are non-
collaborative. As for the passive models, not only they
preserve this advantage, but they also minimise the clas-
sical communications between labs and inside each lab:
since R = 1, the consistency tests vanish and a single unit
per lab conducts the lab-to-lab classical communications.
Lastly, as stated above, the corruption model of the
units also determines the authentication cost, lAU. To
be precise, Protocol consumes R2 key pools with a pre-
fixed size of |k| bits (see Eq. (4)), where |k| is estimated
in Eq. (5) and R is given in Table 1 for each model.
Also, using the same argument as in Sec. II A 2, the total
authentication error probability, AU, and the individual
error probability, γAU, are related as indicated in Eq. (6)
for active corruption of the CP units, and simply as
AU ≥ (nq + 1)γAU (9)
for passive corruption.
III. DISCUSSION
Finally, we show the practicality of Protocol for the
post-processing of QKD in the presence of corrupted de-
vices. For this purpose, we combine it with well-known
QKD schemes to evaluate the resulting secret key rate,
K, given by Eq. (3), in the finite data regime.
For concreteness, we assume the same corruption
model for the QKD modules and the CP units, a nat-
ural supposition in practice. Moreover, we restrict our-
selves to the extreme corruption models, AC and PN, as
the intermediate scenarios (AN and PC) do not allow to
enhance the secret key rate, disregarding the authentica-
tion cost (see Sec. II B). We also assume that Alice and
Bob use the minimum number of devices that allows for
K > 0, which depends on the corruption model they con-
sider. For AC corruption, this means that they agree on
the number tq ≥ 0 (tc ≥ 0) of malicious QKD pairs (CP
units per lab) they want to be protected against, and use
nq = tq + 1 pairs (nc = 3tc + 1 units per lab). Alter-
natively, for PN corruption, they use nq = 2 QKD pairs
and nc = 2 CP units per party, which suffices to achieve
K > 0 even if all the devices are possibly malicious (see
Sec. II B).
Also, the number of units in every σAi (σ
B
i ), R, is fixed
by the pre-agreed corruption model via Table 1. R deter-
mines the total authentication cost, lAU, via Eq. (4), and
the value of the individual authentication error probabil-
ity, γAU, via Eq. (6) in the AC model and via Eq. (9) in
the PN model.
We consider two practical QKD protocols with decoy
states: an efficient MDI-QKD scheme [36] with three de-
coy intensities in the basis X (devoted to PE) and one
signal intensity in the basis Z (devoted to key distilla-
tion), and the standard decoy-state BB84 scheme [37]
with three decoy intensities per basis. Detailed analyses
of these protocols are provided in Appendices E and F of
the Supplementary Information, respectively. For each
protocol, we compute estimates of the secret key length,
l (given by Eq. (1) for the AC model and by Eq. (7) for
the PN model), and the authentication cost, lAU (given
by Eq. (4)), by setting the observables to their expected
values according to respective channel models described
in the cited appendices. These channel models depend
on various common experimental parameters: the effi-
ciency of the photo-detectors, set to ηdet = 65%, their
dark count probability, set to pd = 7.2× 10−8 (both val-
ues matching the recent MDI-QKD experiment reported
in [38]), and the polarization misalignment, set to, say
δmis = 0.08 for illustration purposes. Moreover, in both
the MDI-QKD and the BB84 schemes, the weakest de-
coy intensity is set to ω = 10−3 for the numerics. In each
case, we optimise the remaining protocol inputs (i.e., in-
tensity settings, and basis and decoy probabilities) to
maximize K as a function of the channel loss between
Alice and Bob.
For the finite key analysis, we select a post-processing
block-size of M bits. Then, for every value of the chan-
nel loss, we choose the smallest number of transmission
rounds per QKD pair, N , that assures that all nq sifted
keys reach this block-size except with a probability of,
say γsift = 5× 10−3, according to the channel model.
Regarding the EC leakage, we assume the typical
model |sy(sjB)∣∣ = MfECh(Etol) for every EC syndrome,
where fEC = 1.16 is the efficiency of the EC protocol,
h(·) is the binary entropy function, and Etol is a pre-
fixed threshold QBER. In particular, Etol is an upper
bound on the QBER that any pair of sifted keys can
reach according to the channel model, except with an
error probability of γEC = 5× 10−3.
Finally, the security parameters are set to cor =
sec = 10
−8 and AU = 5 × 10−9. Given sec and AU,
the remaining parameters, PA and δ, entering the ex-
tractable key length, l, are determined by imposing a
common value, γsec, for every error term that contributes
to ˆsec = sec − AU (given by Eq. (2) and Eq. (8)).
7In particular, from the PE procedure presented in Ap-
pendix E (Appendix F), it follows that γsec = ˆsec/48
(γsec = ˆsec/20) in the MDI-QKD (BB84) scheme within
both the AC and the PN scenarios, where we used the
fact that nq = 2 in the latter case.
Adhering to all the above, in Fig. 2, we plot the secret
key rate, K, as a function of the total channel loss, for
the AC and the PN models in the MDI-QKD scheme,
considering the symmetric case where both Alice and Bob
are at the same distance of the central untrusted node.
The corresponding figure for the BB84 scheme is included
in Appendix F of the Supplementary Information. In
both cases, for illustration purposes two different block-
sizes are considered, M ∈ {105, 106}. Within the AC
corruption model, for concreteness we only address the
symmetric case tq = tc = t, such that nq = t + 1 and
nc = 3t + 1. Hence, we use the notation KAC,t (lAC,t)
for the secret key rate (length) secure against t corrupted
devices of each kind in this model. Similarly, KPN (lPN)
denotes the secret key rate (length) in the PN model,
which, as explained above, unambiguously requires nq =
nc = 2. Lastly, Khonest (lhonest) denotes the secret key
rate (length) assuming all-honest devices, i.e., Khonest =
KAC,0 (lhonest = lAC,0). Note that the honest scenario
corresponds to the standard situation where each party
holds one QKD module and one CP unit and both of
them are trusted.
The conclusions gathered from Fig. 2 are readily un-
derstood in view of the results of Sec. II. In the first place,
for both M = 105 and M = 106, we find that the secret
key rate in the PN model matches that of the AC model
with t = 1 to a precision that cannot be distinguished
in the figure, i.e., KPN ≈ KAC,1. This follows from the
fact that, in both cases, two raw keys are generated (as
nq = 2) and the parties need to remove the information
from one of them via PA. Indeed, comparing Eq. (1) and
Eq. (2) with Eq. (7) and Eq. (8), one observes that
lPN = lAC,1, (10)
i.e., the secret key lengths coincide exactly for given secu-
rity parameters. Thus, the minuscule difference between
KPN and KAC,1 comes from the authentication cost, as
lAU is proportional to R
2, with R = 2t + 1 (R = 1) in
the AC (PN) setting.
An identical argument relatesKAC,t andKhonest/(t+1)
for all t. This is so because, for fixed security parameters,
sec, cor and AU, and fixed experimental inputs, N and
Etol, the exact same secret key length can be extracted
via PA in both scenarios (see Eq. (1) and Eq. (2)). That
is to say,
lAC,t = lhonest (11)
for all t. This length corresponds to the key material
coming from the honest QKD pair in the AC model,
which matches the honest scenario. At the same time,
in the presence of t malicious QKD pairs, the extraction
of the above key length requires the generation of t + 1
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FIG. 2: Secret key rate, K, that results from combining
Protocol with a decoy-state MDI-QKD scheme [36] in
various adversarial scenarios with malicious devices, as
a function of the total channel loss between Alice and
Bob (assumed to be at the same distance of the
untrusted measurement node). Two finite block-sizes
are considered, (a) M = 105 and (b) M = 106. In both
figures, the purple line is the secret key rate in the
standard scenario —where each party holds one QKD
module and one classical post-processing (CP) unit,
both of them trusted by hypothesis— and green lines
denote different adversarial scenarios. In particular, the
dashed-dotted phosphorescent line is the extractable
secret key rate assuming that the corrupted devices are
passive and non-collaborative, which requires the use of
two QKD pairs and two CP units per lab (all of them
being possibly malicious) to provide security. A more
conservative adversarial scenario is represented by the
solid non-phosphorescent green lines, which assume
active and collaborative corrupted devices. These lines
further assume the same number, say t, of malicious
QKD pairs and malicious CP units per lab, which
requires the use of at least nq = t+ 1 QKD pairs and
nc = 3t+ 1 CP units per party to provide security.
Specifically, the dark (light) green line corresponds to
t = 3 (t = 5).
8raw keys in the AC model. Thus, as K = (l−lAU)/(nqN)
in general, it follows that
Khonest
t+ 1
−KAC,t = δlAU
(t+ 1)N
(12)
for fixed experimental and security parameters, where
δlAU denotes the extra authentication cost of the AC
model with tq = tc = t, compared to the honest
scenario. Due to the factor N−1 in the right-hand side
of Eq. (12), larger block sizes lead to smaller differences
between Khonest/(t + 1) and KAC,t. Finally, since
KAC,t ∝ (lhonest − lAU) and lAU ∝ (2t + 1)2 in the AC
corruption model, KAC,t vanishes for any given block
size if a large enough number of CP units is considered,
as eventually lAU > lhonest. This is the case for M = 10
5
and t = 5 in Fig. 2.
Putting it all together, this work is a fundamental step
forward towards the development of practical and secure
QKD setups in the presence of malicious devices possi-
bly sabotaged by a third party, a major threat against
classical cryptography today that cannot be put aside in
the quantum-safe era.
IV. METHODS
A. Conditional verifiable secret sharing
Here, we introduce a modified version of the VSS
scheme presented in [26] that contemplates the possibil-
ity of aborting, thus providing a weaker cryptographic
primitive than standard VSS. For this reason, we refer to
it as conditional VSS.
We consider a scenario with one possibly corrupted
dealer, D, and a set of n parties, P = {P1, . . . , Pn}, t
of which are possibly corrupted. In this setting, a con-
ditional VSS scheme is a pair of protocols, (Share, Re-
construct), satisfying three properties: privacy, condi-
tional commitment and conditional correctness (defined
below). In full generality, Share and Reconstruct run as
follows. During Share, D distributes an input m among
the n parties, which pairwise perform consistency tests on
their common information via secure channels and pos-
sibly abort. Upon non-abortion of Share, during Recon-
struct the parties collaborate to retrieve m. The defining
properties of conditional VSS are given below:
1. Privacy. If D is honest, the information obtained
by any set of t or less parties prior to Reconstruct
is independent of m.
2. Conditional commitment. Upon non-abortion
of Share, Reconstruct yields the same output for all
honest (and/or passively corrupted) parties.
3. Conditional correctness. Upon non-abortion of
Share, if D is honest the common output of all hon-
est (and/or passively corrupted) parties is the input
m.
As for the corrupted parties, all four non-mixed corrup-
tion models presented in the main text shall be addressed:
AC, AN, PC and PN. However, we do not restrict to any
of them yet. As for the dealer, a corrupted D can dis-
tribute incorrect or inconsistent information about his
input to the parties. If, in addition, the corrupted par-
ties are collaborative, a corrupted D can collaborate with
them too, following Eve’s instructions and possibly shar-
ing his private information with them.
In what follows, we describe a pair of protocols,
(Share, Reconstruct), that depend on various settings,
and such that adequate choices of these settings confer
the pair the category of a conditional VSS scheme. We
remark that the adequacy of some given settings depends
on the corruption model one assumes for the parties. As
in the main text, the protocol definitions below assume
that the parties and the dealer do not misbehave,
whether or not these protocols are robust against active
corruption. Also, the dealer’s input m is assumed to
be a binary string, and we recall that the symbol “⊕”
denotes bitwise XOR. In addition, this operation is
generalised to a pair of strings with different lengths by
padding the shortest one with as many zeros as necessary
for the lengths to match. This said, Share runs as follows.
Share protocol
1. D uses a q-out-of-q SS scheme to split a message
m into q random shares, by selecting the first q− 1
shares mi at random and then choosing mq = m⊕
m1 ⊕ . . .⊕mq−1.
2. For i = 1, . . . , q, D sends mi to all the parties in a
certain subset, say σi ( P, via secure channels. If
any of these parties does not receive the share, she
takes a zero bit string as default share.
3. If |σi| > 1, all pairs of parties in σi perform a con-
sistency test: they send each other their copies of
mi over secure channels to check if they are equal.
If any party finds an inconsistency, she aborts the
protocol.
Importantly, abortion proceeds in two steps: the
aborting party sends an abortion order to all other
parties, and each receiving party resends the order to
all the rest. Upon reception of an abortion order, the
parties abort. Step two assures that the honest (and/or
passively corrupted) parties always abort collectively.
Upon non-abortion of Share, Reconstruct runs as follows.
Reconstruct protocol
1. All pairs of parties send each other their shares
through authenticated channels.
2. For i = 1, . . . , q, each party uses MV to reconstruct
the share mi, and then obtains m = ⊕qi=1mi.
In general, in order for MV to be well-defined, the
output must be set to a default value in case of a tie.
9Nevertheless, ties never occur for the adequate choices
of the parameters n and q and the subsets σi we present
next.
Proposition 1. Let t be the maximum number of
corrupted parties, and let {T1, . . . , T(nt)} be any ordered
list of all possible combinations of t parties. Under the
following settings, (Share, Reconstruct) defines a condi-
tional VSS scheme:
1. n = 3t+1, q =
(
n
t
)
and σi = P/Ti (AC corruption).
2. n = 2t+ 2, q = n and σi = P/Pi (AN corruption).
3. n = t+ 1, q = n and σi = Pi (PC corruption).
4. n = 2, q = n and σi = Pi (PN corruption).
What is more, the above settings are optimal in the
number of parties.
The reader is referred to Appendix D in the Supple-
mentary Information for a proof of Proposition 1.
Finally, we remark that the above conditional VSS
scheme enables secure MPC of linear functions of the
shared private input in a very simple way. Let L(·) be the
linear function to be computed on m. Upon non-abortion
of Share, each party applies L to its shares of m, in so ob-
taining shares of L(m). Since this step requires null com-
munication, privacy, conditional commitment and condi-
tional correctness are trivially maintained.
B. Generation of random bit strings
Protocol also relies on the possibility to generate un-
biased random bit strings (RBS) of a pre-fixed length L
among n parties (the CP units in Protocol), when up to
t of them are possibly corrupted. In what follows, we
describe a RBS generation protocol suitable for the ac-
tive corruption models, AC and AN, that builds on con-
ditional VSS to safeguard the randomness of its output
string (the passive models shall be addressed afterwards).
Let us set the total number of parties, n, the total
number of shares, q, and the subsets of parties, σi, as
specified in Proposition 1 for the considered model (AC
or AN). The protocol runs as follows.
RBS generation protocol
1. For k = 1, . . . , t + 1, Pk creates a random L-bit
string, Rk, and distributes it among all n parties
(including itself) using Share. If, for some k, Share
aborts, the RBS generation protocol aborts. If a
party receives any share whose length differs from
L, she aborts.
2. Upon non-abortion of step 1, the parties use Re-
construct to obtain Rk for all k = 1 . . . , t+1. Then,
each of them individually calculates R = ⊕t+1k=1Rk.
Proposition 2. The RBS generation protocol outputs
a common random L-bits string for all honest (and/or
passively corrupted) parties.
The reader is referred to Appendix D in the Supple-
mentary Information for a proof of Proposition 2.
Finally, using the standard notion of passivity given in
the main text, one can avoid the use of conditional VSS
for RBS generation in the passive models (PC and PN).
Instead, any given unit can generate the strings directly,
and such strings are truly random by assumption.
V. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank Liu Zhang Chen-Da for useful discussions
on verifiable secret sharing and secure multiparty com-
putation. We acknowledge support from the Spanish
Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (MINECO),
the Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional (FEDER)
through the grant TEC2017-88243-R, and the Euro-
pean Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation pro-
gramme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agree-
ment No 675662 (project QCALL) for financial support.
VZ gratefully acknowledges support from a FPU schol-
arship from the Spanish Ministry of Education.
Appendix A: Proof of the security claim
Here, we give a detailed proof of Claim (see the main text), which establishes the security of Protocol when the
corrupted QKD modules (CP units) belong to the AC corruption model. Notably, security follows identically for
all the alternative models we consider, as it builds on (1) the defining properties of conditional VSS (established for
each corruption model of the CP units in the main text), (2) the extractable secret key length (established for each
corruption model of the QKD pairs in the main text), and (3) the redundancy of the classical communications of
Protocol.
Below, we use asterisks to identify either the well-defined versions reconstructible by honest units of quantities with
the conditional commitment property of conditional VSS (that is, the raw keys, the sifted keys, the EC syndromes,
the EV and PA hash functions, the corrected keys, the EV tags and the final keys), or unique quantities consistently
held by honest units, to which the QKD modules are committed too (that is, the protocol information, the sifting
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information, the hypothetical lower bounds computed in the PE step, the error pattern and the secret key length).
Note that the latter are not divided into shares.
1. Correctness
We first prove the correctness established in Claim. Precisely, Claim asserts the cor-correctness of the output
keys upon non-abortion of Protocol (if Protocol aborts, correctness follows trivially). Hence, let us assume Protocol
does not abort and refer to conditional commitment (conditional correctness) simply as commitment (correctness) for
conciseness.
In the first place, the Share protocol in step 1 guarantees the commitment of the raw keys. In the second place,
given the commitment of the raw keys, the commitment of the sifted keys follows from the uniqueness of the sifting
information, say {sift∗j}nqj=1, used by the honest CP units to sift their shares of the raw keys. And, in particular, the
uniqueness of {siftj∗}nqj=1 is trivially enforced by the consistency tests and the redundancy of the communications in
step 2. In the third place, given the commitment of the sifted keys, the commitment of the corrected keys is enforced
by the uniqueness of the error pattern eˆ∗ that all honest CPAl ∈ σA1 apply on their copies of the first share of the
sifted key. In turn, the uniqueness of eˆ∗ follows from the commitment of the syndrome strings syA and syB, ensured
by the commitment of the sifted keys and the redundancy of the communications. Fourthly, the commitment of the
EV tags hEV,A (hEV,B) follows from the commitment of the corrected keys and that of the function hEV (assured by
the RBS generation protocol). In particular, due to the redundancy of the classical communications in step 5, all
honest CPBl′ ∈ σB1 reach the well-defined copies h∗EV,A and h∗EV,B, where h∗EV,A = h∗EV(sˆ∗A) (h∗EV,B = h∗EV(s∗B)) is the
well-defined EV tag reached by all honest CPAl (CPBl′ ), computed on the well-defined corrected key sˆ
∗
A (sifted key
s∗B). Furthermore, from step 5 of Protocol it follows that EV aborts if h
∗
EV,A 6= h∗EV,B. Conversely, no abortion of
the EV step guarantees that h∗EV,A = h
∗
EV,B. The ˆcor-correctness follows from this fact as long as h
∗
EV (well-defined
EV function reached by all honest CPBl at the RBS generation protocol) is a random 2-universal hash function with
output length dlog2(2/ˆcor)e at least [39]. But this is indeed ensured by the correctness of conditional VSS within
the RBS generation protocol. To finish with, the commitment of the final keys follows from the commitment of the
corrected keys and that of the function hPA. In turn, the latter follows from the commitment of conditional VSS
within the RBS generation protocol, in which all honest CPBl′ ∈ σB1 select a unique length l∗ due to the consistency
tests in step 1 and the redundancy of the classical communications. Also note that the commitment of hPA (plus the
redundancy of the communications) guarantees that correctness is not compromised in the final PA step.
Notably, one should not confuse the correctness of conditional VSS (see the Methods section in the main text)
with the correctness of the output keys of Protocol. In fact, except from the implicit use of correctness in the RBS
generation protocol, only the commitment (but not the correctness or the privacy) of conditional VSS is required to
establish the correctness of the final keys.
Lastly, we remark that an authentication error may allow a corrupted CP unit to impersonate an honest one, thus
possibly compromising the correctness. Therefore, one must compose the error probability, ˆcor, of the EC —which
presumes the successful authentication of all the classical communications— with the total error probability of the
authentication, AU, pre-selected by Alice and Bob. In this way, the overall correctness parameter is
cor = ˆcor + AU. (A1)
2. Secrecy
In what follows, we prove the secrecy established in Claim. Importantly, the reasoning we present below does not
assume a specific QKD protocol, but it applies to a wide variety of them.
We assume again that Protocol does not abort. Given the redundancy of the communications and the uniqueness
of l∗ (established in the previous section), the RBS generation protocol guarantees that all honest CP units reach
a well-defined function h∗PA (conditional commitment) and that this function is indeed a 2-universal hash function
of length l∗ selected at random, as required for PA [31] (conditional correctness). Under these circumstances, the
sec-secrecy of k
∗
A and k
∗
B asserted in Claim follows as long as l
∗ is a valid lower bound on the extractable secret key
length, which we prove in what follows.
By applying PA with 2-universal hashing [31], a ˆsec-secret key can be extracted from the well-defined concatenated
sifted key s∗B = [s
1∗
B , · · · , snq∗B ] as long as l∗ verifies [39]
l∗ ≤
⌊
Hmin(s
∗
B|E′)− 2 log2
(
1
2PA
)⌋
, (A2)
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for all ˆsec ≥ + PA, where Hmin(s∗B|E′) is the -smooth min-entropy of s∗B conditioned on the (possibly quantum)
information E′ held by Eve, and PA is the error probability of PA. To derive a lower bound on Hmin(s
∗
B|E′), it is
crucial to note that s∗B is statistically uncorrelated to any subset of shares possibly held by any group of corrupted
CP units due to the privacy of conditional VSS. As a consequence, Eve cannot extract any information from the
units beyond the one she learns from the corrupted QKD pairs, the classical communications between labs, and her
interaction with the quantum channel. This said, the derivation goes as follows.
Without loss of generality, E′ can be decomposed as E′ = CE, where C denotes the information gained by Eve
when she learns the syndrome, sy∗B, and the EV tag, h
∗
EV,B, and E denotes the information she holds in advance
of that. According to Protocol, EC is applied individually on each sj∗A to reconcile it with the corresponding s
j∗
B .
In particular, the well-defined syndrome information that the honest CPBl′ ∈ σB1 send to the CPAl ∈ σA1 splits as
sy∗B = [sy
∗(s1∗B ), . . . , sy
∗(snq∗B )]. Clearly, all nq items in syB but the one that comes from the honest QKD pair are
possibly known to Eve a priori. If we denote the pair index of the honest QKD pair by “h”, this implies that only
sy∗(sh∗B ) contributes to C, together with the error verification tag h
∗
EV,B, whose size is |h∗EV,B| = dlog2(2/ˆcor)e bits.
Then, from a chain inequality for smooth entropies [39], Hmin(s
∗
B|E′) ≥ Hmin(s∗B|E)− |C| and therefore
Hmin(s
∗
B|E′) ≥ Hmin(s∗B|E)−
∣∣sy∗(sh∗B )∣∣− ⌈log2( 2ˆcor
)⌉
. (A3)
If we use the decomposition s∗B = s
h∗
B s
d∗
B (where s
d∗
B includes all the substrings of s
∗
B that come from dishonest QKD
pairs), the following chain rule holds [40]. For all ε, ε′ ≥ 0 and for all  such that  > 2ε+ ε′,
Hmin(s
h∗
B s
d∗
B |E) ≥ Hεmin(sh∗B |sd∗B E) +Hε
′
min(s
d∗
B |E)− log2
(
1
− 2ε− ε′
)
, (A4)
where ε and ε′ are the smoothing parameters of the corresponding smooth min-entropies [39]. We recall that, following
Protocol, Alice and Bob agree on ε a priori. Also, one can set ε′ = 0 and use the trivial bound Hε
′
min(s
d∗
B |E) ≥ 0 valid
for all ε′ ≥ 0, as sd∗B could be entirely known to Eve. This amounts to say that sd∗B is included in E, which further
implies that Hεmin(s
h∗
B |sd∗B E) = Hεmin(sh∗B |E). From these two results, inserting Eq. (A4) in Eq. (A3) one finds
H2ε+δmin (s
∗
B|E′) ≥ Hεmin(sh∗B |E)−
∣∣sy∗(sh∗B )∣∣− log2( 4ˆcorδ
)
, (A5)
where we use the fact that dlog2(2/cor)e ≤ log2 (4/cor) and also define δ = − 2ε, such that δ > 0. Further inserting
the previous equation in Eq. (A2), it follows that one can extract
l∗ ≤
⌊
Hεmin(s
h∗
B |E)−
∣∣sy∗(sh∗B )∣∣− log2( 1ˆcor2PAδ
)⌋
(A6)
ˆsec-secret key bits for all
ˆsec ≥ 2ε+ δ + PA, (A7)
and δ > 0.
Notably, the analysis above is conditioned on the successful authentication of all the classical communications.
Setting a common error probability, γAU, for every authentication, it follows that the total authentication error
verifies AU ≥ (tc + 1)2(nq + 1)γAU, as explained in the Results section of the main text. Moreover, the overall secrecy
parameter is given by
sec = ˆsec + AU. (A8)
Crucially, the honest QKD pair is unknown and thus Eq. (A6) cannot be evaluated in practice. However, it implies
a looser but more convenient bound that does not rely on the knowledge of the honest pair by assuming a worst case
scenario. Precisely, let hj∗ε denote the hypothetical lower bound on H
ε
min(s
j∗
B |E) determined by (infoj∗A , infoj∗B ). As we
also did in the main text, we use the term hypothetical here because, even though the j-th QKD pair is committed to
a single value hj∗ε via (info
j∗
A , info
j∗
B ), one cannot assure that such h
j∗
ε is a valid lower bound on H
ε
min(s
j∗
B |E) unless
j = h. Let us further explain this point. On the one hand, if j 6= h, (infoj∗A , infoj∗B ) might be unfaithful information
—thus, unsuitable for correct parameter estimation (PE)— and indeed Hmin(s
j∗
B |E) = 0 might hold for all . On the
other hand, let us focus on the case j = h. In Sec. A 1, we established the conditional commitment of all the raw
keys, the concatenated sifted keys, the concatenated corrected keys and the final keys. In an identical fashion, since
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nq = tq + 1, the conditional correctness of conditional VSS implies that the pair of raw keys coming from the honest
modules QKDAh and QKDBh is generated, sifted, reconciled and subjected to PA correctly by an honest majority of
CP units in each lab. Thus, in particular, hh∗ε is a valid lower bound on H
ε
min(s
h∗
B |E). This said, the more convenient
lower bound on Hεmin(s
h∗
B |E)−
∣∣sy∗(sh∗B )∣∣ that we referred to above is given by minj{hj∗ε − ∣∣sy∗(sjB)∣∣}, such that the
well defined l∗ reached by all honest CP units reads
l∗ =
⌊
min
j
{
hj∗ε −
∣∣sy∗(sj∗B )∣∣}− log2( 1ˆcor2PAδ
)⌋
. (A9)
Appendix B: Authentication scheme
We consider the authentication scheme presented in [41] and described in [35], based on the construction of Toeplitz
matrices using a linear feedback seed register (LFSR).
The sender and the receiver must pre-share a key pool of secret bits, and for every classical message m to be
authenticated, they draw bits from this key pool to construct a LFSR-based Toeplitz matrix T . Let γAU (|m|) be a
pre-fixed error probability (the length of the message m), and let k = dlog2 (2|m|/γAU)e. The construction of T uses
2k secret bits and the size of the resulting matrix is k × |m|. The sender multiplies the matrix T by the message
m to generate an authentication tag t = T ×m, of k bits. Then, he encrypts the tag using the one-time-pad, thus
consuming another k secret bits from the key pool. Nevertheless, the encryption of the tag guarantees that the first
2k bits used for the construction of T remain secure and can be reallocated in the key pool, in such a way that
the net secret key cost of the authentication is k bits. Finally, the sender transmits both m and its encrypted tag
through the public channel. The receiver calculates its own tag using T and the received message, and authentication
succeeds if this tag matches the one sent by the sender after decrypting it.
Appendix C: Secret key length in the PN corruption model for the QKD modules
In this section we derive the secret key length of Protocol under the assumption that the possibly corrupted QKD
pairs are passive and non-collaborative (i.e., they belong to the PN corruption model). The use of asterisks to identify
well-defined/unique quantities is not required here because, by assumption, the possibly corrupted devices are passive.
As explained in the main text, in this scenario we assume nq = tq. This choice allows to fairly compare the
performance of the AC and the PN corruption models in terms of the secret key rate, and it means that every QKD
pair might be corrupted by an independent eavesdropper, say Evej , with j = 1, . . . nq. Let us focus on one of them,
say Evev. We denote by Ev the information held by Evev prior to the information reconciliation (IR) step of Protocol.
Defining, for instance, Z1 = s
v
B, Zj = s
j−1
B for j = 2, . . . , v and Zj = s
j
B for j = v + 1, . . . , nq, the next holds:
1. H1min(Z1|Ev) = 0 for all 1.
2. H
′j
min(Zj |Zj−1 . . . Z1Ev) = H
′j
min(Zj |Ev) for all ′j and j = 2, . . . , nq.
Therefore, one can apply the simplified version, Eq. (H5), of the generalised chain rule for conditional smooth min-
entropies presented in Appendix H. This yields,
H
(nq−1)(2ε+δ)
min (sB|Ev) ≥
nq∑
j 6=v
Hεmin(s
j
B|Ev)− log2
(
1
δnq−1
)
, (C1)
with ε, δ > 0 and nq ≥ 2. Coming next, we account for the information that Evev gains at the IR step. The total
information held by Evev a posteriori of IR can be decomposed as E
′
v = CvEv, where Cv denotes the information she
learns during IR. Precisely, Cv contemplates all the syndromes, sy(s
j
B), with j 6= v, and the EV tag hEV,B, such that|hEV,B| = dlog2(2/ˆcor)e. Therefore, from a chain inequality for smooth entropies [39] previously used in Appendix A,
we have that
H
(nq−1)(2ε+δ)
min (sB|E
′
v) ≥
nq∑
j 6=v
{
Hεmin(s
j
B|Ev)− |sy(sjB)|
}
− log2
(
4
ˆcorδn−1
)
. (C2)
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By applying PA with 2-universal hashing [31], a key that is ˆsec-secret with respect to E
′
v can be extracted from sB,
as long as the output length satisfies [39]
l ≤
⌊
nq∑
j 6=v
{
Hεmin(s
j
B|Ev)−
∣∣sy(sjB)∣∣}− log2( 1ˆcor2PAδnq−1
)⌋
, (C3)
for all
ˆsec ≥ (nq − 1)(2ε+ δ) + PA. (C4)
Lastly, composing the total authentication error AU (pre-agreed by the parties), the overall secrecy parameter reads
sec = ˆsec + AU, (C5)
where we recall that the pre-agreed AU depends on the corruption model of the CP units, as shown in the Results
section of the main text.
Finally, note that Eq. (C3) determines the extractable key length that provides security with respect to the infor-
mation E
′
v held by Evev. Nevertheless, one can provide security against all {Evev}nqv=1 by taking
l =
⌊
min
v
nq∑
j 6=v
{
Hεmin(s
j
B|Ev)−
∣∣sy(sjB)∣∣}− log2( 1ˆcor2PAδnq−1
)⌋
. (C6)
FIG. 3: Depiction of a setting where nq − 1 non-collaborative eavesdroppers, {Evev}v 6=j (where Evev is the
eavesdropper controlling the v-th QKD pair), attack the quantum communication between QKDAj and QKDBj . If
the possibly corrupted QKD pairs are passive, by definition Evej has total access to the internal information of
QKDAj and QKDBj , but the latter do not deviate from Protocol.
To conclude this part, we remark that, according to the PE step of Protocol, every CPBl′ ∈ σB1 computes a
hypothetical lower bound hjε on the ε-smooth min-entropy of s
j
B conditioned on an eavesdropper’s information up
to the PE step. As already discussed in Appendix A, in the AC corruption model, hjε does not necessarily pose a
lower bound on Hεmin(s
j
B|E). However, by assumption, in the PN model the QKD modules deliver faithful protocol
information and thus hjε is indeed a lower bound on H
ε
min(s
j
B|Ev) for all v 6= j. Finally, we recall that security against
the eavesdroppers that corrupt the QKD modules guarantees security against possible eavesdroppers that corrupt the
CP units (irrespectively of their corruption model) due to the privacy of conditional VSS (see the Methods section in
the main text).
Appendix D: Proof of propositions 1 and 2
Here, we give detailed proofs of propositions 1 and 2 in the Methods section of the main text.
1. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 establishes adequate settings under which the pair of protocols (Share, Reconstruct) presented in
the Methods section of the main text defines a conditional VSS scheme for every non-mixed corruption model of the
parties. Here, we address all four scenarios one by one.
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1. AC corruption (t > 0). The considered settings are n = 3t + 1, q =
(
n
t
)
and σi = P/Ti for i = 1, . . . , q.
Let {T1, . . . , T(nt)} be an ordered list of all possible combinations of t parties. Since an honest D distributes m
according to the previous settings, every combination of t parties is missing exactly one distinct share. Thus,
privacy follows. Let us now assume that, for some i, two honest parties in σi receive different copies of mi —note
that such parties are guaranteed to exist for all i, because |σi| = n−t = 2t+1 ≥ t+2 for all t > 0—. Then, Share
certainly aborts. Conversely, upon non-abortion of Share, all honest parties in each σi hold identical copies of
mi (possibly, a default zero string). What is more, |σi| = 2t + 1 implies that every σi contains a majority
of honest parties, such that conditional commitment follows from the use of MV in Reconstruct. Conditional
commitment implies that, upon non-abortion of Share, D is committed to an input with respect to the honest
parties. Conditional correctness follows identically as conditional commitment, given the fact that an honest D
commits to his actual input value m. This completes the proof.
Note that, in the AC model, n > 3t is necessary to assure conditional commitment by enforcing the success of
MV during Reconstruct. In fact, it is known to be a general necessary condition for secure MPC [23–25], such
that setting n = 3t+1 is optimal. What is more, within our conditional VSS scheme, any attempt to reduce the
total number of shares, q, comes at the price of increasing the number of parties, n. To see this, let us assume
that such improved settings exist, satisfying all three properties of conditional VSS while keeping q <
(
n
t
)
for
a given number of parties, n. On the one hand, privacy implies that every combination of t parties is missing
one share at least. On the other hand, by the pigeonhole principle, q <
(
n
t
)
implies that at least two distinct
combinations of t parties, say Tk and Tl, have one common missing share, say ms, for some s = 1, . . . , q. Since
|Tk ∪ Tl| ≥ t+ 1, it follows that |σs| ≤ n− t− 1, and thus conditional commitment requires n ≥ 3t+ 2 at least,
in order for MV to certainly succeed when applied to all copies of ms.
2. AN corruption (t > 1). The considered settings are n = 2t + 2, q = n and σi = P/Pi for i = 1, . . . , q. Since
an honest D distributes m according to the previous settings, every party is missing exactly one distinct share.
This suffices to establish privacy in a non-collaborative setting. Let us now assume that, for some i, two honest
parties in σi receive different copies of mi —note that such parties are guaranteed to exist for all i, because
|σi| = n − 1 = 2t + 1 > t + 2 for all t > 1—. Then, Share certainly aborts. Conversely, upon non-abortion of
Share, all honest parties in each σi hold identical copies of mi (possibly, a default zero string), and since every
σi contains a majority of honest parties, conditional commitment follows from the use of MV in Reconstruct.
Conditional correctness follows identically as in the AC model.
The optimality of the setting n = 2t+ 2 for the pair of protocols (Share, Reconstruct) in the AN model follows
from the next lemma.
Lemma. If, for some i = 1, . . . , q, |σi| < 2t + 1, the pair of protocols (Share, Reconstruct) does not provide a
conditional VSS scheme in the AN model.
For the AC model, such an assertion is straightforward. However, at a first glance, it seems reasonable that non-
collaboration of the corrupted parties may allow to overcome the restriction that each share is held by an honest
majority of parties. This is so because, for any given share mi, the values declared by any two corrupted parties
in σi that misbehave during Reconstruct are not expected to coincide, except with the minuscule probability of
a random match. Nevertheless, Lemma states that this is not the case, and we prove it in what follows. For this
purpose, let us consider that D is corrupted, and let us assume the worst-case scenario where, for some i, σi
contains all t corrupted parties. With a non-negligible probability of success, D could, for instance, select two
distinct versions of the share mi, say m
h
i and m
d
i , and deliver m
h
i (m
d
i ) to all honest (dishonest) parties in σi.
Note that this does not necessarily imply the abortion of Share, as the dishonest parties in σi can simply declare
the copy mhi they receive from the honest ones during the consistency test of mi. If, in addition, |σi| < 2t+ 1,
σi does not contain a majority of honest parties and thus conditional commitment is compromised, because
one cannot assure the consistency of the copies of mi reached by all honest parties via MV. This completes the
proof.
In summary, |σi| ≥ 2t + 1 is necessary for (Share, Reconstruct) to define a conditional VSS scheme in the AN
model. Since, in addition, σi ( P, the requirement n ≥ 2t+ 2 follows, which means that our setting n = 2t+ 2
is optimal. In addition, as in the AC model, direct application of the pigeonhole principle implies that any
attempt to reduce the total number of shares, q, comes at the price of increasing the number of parties, n, in
order to maintain the defining properties of conditional VSS.
3. PC corruption (t > 0). The considered settings are n = t + 1, q = n and σi = Pi for i = 1, . . . , q.
Since an honest D distributes m according to the previous settings, every combination of t = n − 1 parties is
missing exactly one distinct share. Thus, privacy follows. In addition, conditional commitment holds due to
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passive corruption of the parties and the fact that |σi| = 1 for all i (which implies that MV trivially succeeds).
Conditional correctness follows identically as in the previous models.
Note that the optimality of n = t + 1 in the PC model is obvious in full generality, and not only within our
specific protocols Share and Reconstruct. This is so because setting n = t would compromise privacy in the
presence of collaborative corrupted parties. Also, as in the previous models, any attempt to reduce the total
number of shares, q, comes at the price of increasing the number of parties (if one aims to preserve conditional
VSS).
Remarkably, as a consequence of considering passive corruption, |σi| = 1 suffices for all i = 1, . . . , q, in which
case step 3 of Share vanishes and thus Share never aborts. This being the case, in the PC model, (Share,
Reconstruct) with the above settings not only provides a conditional VSS scheme, but also a standard VSS
scheme. We also remark that, in the absence of step 3 of Share, no consistency test occurs, which means that
VSS reduces to secret sharing (SS) by definition.
4. PN corruption (t > 1). The considered settings are n = 2, q = n and σi = Pi for i = 1, 2. We clarify
that n = 2 for all t means that it suffices to select two parties out of all corrupted parties in order for (Share,
Reconstruct) to define a conditional VSS scheme. An honest D splits m into two random shares and delivers each
of them to a different party. Privacy holds because each party is missing one share and they do not collaborate.
Conditional commitment follows due to passivity and the fact that |σi| = 1 for i = 1, 2. Conditional correctness
follows identically as in the previous models.
The optimality of n = 2 and q = 2 is trivial, and it is not restricted to our pair of protocols (Share, Reconstruct).
2. Proof of Proposition 2
Let us now prove Proposition 2 of the Methods section of the main text, which asserts that the RBS generation
protocol yields a common random L-bits string for all honest (and/or passively corrupted) parties. The proposition
only applies in the active corruption models.
We address the AC model first, and recall that the settings are selected as prescribed by Proposition 1. Let us
assume that the RBS generation protocol does not abort. This implies that Share terminated successfully for all
k = 1, . . . , t+ 1. In virtue of conditional commitment, non-abortion of Share for, say Pk, means that all honest parties
reach a common string Rk via Reconstruct. Thus, all of them output a common final string R = ⊕t+1k=1Rk. What is
more, non-abortion implies that |Rk| = L bits for all k, such that |R| = L too. Then, Proposition 2 follows if we prove
the randomness of R. On the one hand, since at least one dealer party is honest, say Ph, for some h = 1, . . . , t + 1,
conditional correctness assures that Rh is random. What is more, in virtue of privacy, the information obtained by
any set of t or less parties prior to Reconstruct is independent of Rh. In particular, given that no Share protocol
aborts, all t strings Rk delivered by all t dealers different from Ph are statistically uncorrelated to Rh. Therefore, R
is indeed random.
In the AN model, in principle, privacy, conditional commitment and conditional correctness of conditional VSS
only hold if the corrupted parties do not collaborate with a corrupted dealer (in accordance with the capabilities of
a corrupted dealer specified in the main text). However, when considering the RBS generation protocol, t+ 1 parties
act as dealers at the same time, such that collaboration between each dealer and exactly one party (i.e., himself) is
unavoidable. Nevertheless, it is straightforward to show that this fact does not compromise the defining properties
of conditional VSS, such that the randomness and the length of the output string R are guaranteed using the exact
same argument as in the AC model. Notably, since the parties do not collaborate, one could feel tempted to select
two dealers instead of t + 1, as the strings they would generate would be uncorrelated to each other. Nevertheless,
their bitwise XOR would not be necessarily random due to the active character of the two dealers.
Appendix E: Decoy-state MDI-QKD
Here, we combine Protocol (in the main text) with the efficient MDI-QKD scheme proposed in [36]. In this scheme,
Alice and Bob use a single intensity for the basis Z, devoted to key extraction, and perform PE with the basis X
alone, for which they use three different intensities.
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1. QKD protocol
The description below assumes that the possibly corrupted devices of any kind do not misbehave from the
protocol description. Nevertheless, the scheme is secure against active eavesdroppers (see Claim in the main text).
We define the sets σA1 = {CPAl}Rl=1 and σB1 =
{
CPBl′
}R
l′=1, where we recall that R is given in Table 1 of the
main text for each corruption model of the CP units. For instance, R = 2tc+1 if the AC corruption model is considered.
For j = 1, . . . , nq, QKDAj and QKDBj create the pairs of strings (r
j
A, a
j) and (rjB, b
j), respectively. While rjA and
rjB ∈ {0, 1}N are fully random polarization bit strings, aj and bj ∈ {λ, µ, ν, ω}N are strings of intensities that verify
P
[
aji = λ
]
= P
[
bji = λ
]
= qZ and P
[
aji = a
]
= P
[
bji = a
]
= qXpa, for a ∈ A = {µ, ν, ω} and i = 1, . . . , N . On each
side, the intensity λ determines the use of the basis Z, and the basis X is used otherwise.
Let us now focus on, say, the j-th QKD pair. For i ranging from 1 to N , steps (i) to (iii) are repeated.
(i) State preparation QKDAj (QKDBj ) prepares a phase-randomized weak coherent pulse (PR-WCP) with in-
tensity aji (b
j
i ) in the BB84 state defined by a
j
i and r
j
Ai
(bji and r
j
Bi
).
(ii) Transmission QKDAj and QKDBj send the states to Charles via the quantum channel.
(iii) Measurement If Charles is honest, he measures the received signals with a Bell state measurement (BSM).
After the above quantum communication phase, the distributed QKD post-processing starts. Again, we focus on a
single QKD pair (the j-th one).
1. Distribution of data. Charles sends a N -trit string cj to both modules. If he is honest, this is the string of
successes, such that cji = 1 (c
j
i = 2) if a successful BSM associated to the Bell state |ψ+〉 = 1/
√
2(|01〉 + |10〉)
(|ψ−〉 = 1/√2(|01〉 − |10〉)) occurred at the i-th round, and cji = 0 otherwise. Let aj |cj (bj |cj ) be the restriction
of the intensities string aj (bj) to the non-zero entries of cj . Also, let rjA|cj ,X (rjB|cj ,X) and rjA|cj ,Z (rjB|cj ,Z) be
the restrictions of rjA (r
j
B) to the non-zero entries of c
j where Alice (Bob) uses basis X and basis Z, respectively.
QKDAj (QKDBj ) communicates a
j |cj (cj , bj |cj ) and rjA|cj ,X (rjB|cj ,X) to every CPAl ∈ σA1 (CPBl′ ∈ σB1 ), and
uses the Share protocol of a conditional VSS scheme to distribute shares of rjA|cj ,Z (rjB|cj ,Z) among all CPAl
(CPBl). All the CPAl ∈ σA1 (CPBl′ ∈ σB1 ) perform a consistency test on aj |cj (cj , bj |cj ) and rjA|cj ,X (rjB|cj ,X).
2. Sifting. Every CPAl ∈ σA1 sends aj |cj and rjA|cj ,X to every CPBl′ ∈ σB1 and each of the latter applies MV.
Using aj |cj and bj |cj , each CPBl′ ∈ σB1 unit builds the index sets
Zj =
{
i|cji 6= 0, aji = bji = λ
}
and
X a,bj =
{
i|cji 6= 0, aji = a, bji = b
}
(E1)
for all a, b ∈ A, and checks if the sifting condition ∣∣Zj∣∣ ≥ M is met for a pre-established threshold value M . If
it is not met, the CPBl′ ∈ σB1 abort the protocol. In case of not aborting, the CPBl′ ∈ σB1 forward the set Zj to
the rest of Bob’s units, which apply MV. All together, the CPBl′ perform a RBS generation protocol to select
a random subset Z ′j ⊆ Zj , of size M . Then, Bob’s units proceed to the sifting. Precisely, every CPBl′ builds
its shares of the sifted key sjB = r
j
B|Z′j from those of rjB|cj ,Z (discarding the data external to Z ′j).
3. Parameter estimation. For each pair a, b ∈ A, every CPBl′ ∈ σB1 builds the PE strings rjB|Xa,bj and r
j
A|Xa,bj
from the respective strings rjA|cj ,X and rjB|cj ,X, discarding the data external to X a,bj . Also, every CPBl′ ∈
σB1 performs the required bit flips on the strings r
j
B|Xa,bj depending on the list of successes, c
j , declared by
QKDBj (see [42, 43]). In this way, r
j
A|Xa,bj and r
j
B|Xa,bj are properly correlated for all a, b. Then, each of them
computes the numbers of bit errors
eja,b =
∣∣Xa,bj ∣∣∑
k=1
rjAk
∣∣
Xa,bj
⊕ rjBk
∣∣
Xa,bj
, (E2)
17
where rjAk
∣∣
Xa,bj
(rjBk
∣∣
Xa,bj
) denotes the k-th bit of the corresponding string. Using |Zj | and the different
∣∣X a,bj ∣∣
and eja,b, every CPBl′ ∈ σB1 computes a lower bound on the number nj11,Z of single-photon successes in Z ′j and
an upper bound on the single-photon phase-error rate φj11,Z associated to the single-photon successes in Z ′j .
The above steps 1 to 3 are performed for all j = 1, . . . , nq. At this stage, every CPBl′ ∈ σB1 derives a lower
bound l (given in the next section) on the secret key length that can be extracted from the concatenated sifted key
sB = s
1
B . . . s
nq
B via PA. If a CPBl′ ∈ σB1 finds l ≤ 0, it aborts the protocol. Importantly, all CPBl′ ∈ σB1 hold copies of
the first share of sB, so each of them performs the relevant bit flips (see [42, 43]) on its copy of this share to correctly
correlate sA (defined below) and sB.
4. RBS generation. If the protocol does not abort, every CPBl′ ∈ σB1 forwards l to the rest of Bob’s units, which
apply MV. All CPBl′ perform a RBS generation protocol to randomly select two 2-universal hash functions hEV
and hPA, respectively devoted to error verification (EV) and PA. Following [35], if Toeplitz matrices are used
for this purpose, 2dlog2(2/ˆcor)e (Mnq + l − 1) bits are required to specify hEV (hPA).
5. Information reconciliation. Every CPBl′ computes its shares of (1) the concatenated syndromes string
syB = sy(s
1
B) . . . sy(s
nq
B ) and (2) the EV tag hEV,B = hEV(sB). All together, the CPBl′ reconstruct syB and
hEV,B via the Reconstruct protocol of a conditional VSS scheme (see the Methods section in the main text).
Each CPBl′ ∈ σB1 sends the following items to every CPAl ∈ σA1 :
1. The string sZ′ = sZ′1 . . . sZ′nq , where sZ′j specifies, say, the positions in r
j
A|cj ,Z that contribute to Z ′j .
2. The syndrome information sy(sB), together with the description of hEV and the EV tag hEV(sB).
3. The description of hPA.
Each CPAl ∈ σA1 decides on all three items via MV and communicate sZ′ , hEV and hPA to the rest of Alice’s
units, which apply MV too. Then, they proceed as follows. Using sZ′ , all CPAl shrink their shares of rA|c,Z =
r1A|c1,Z . . . rnqA |cnq ,Z into shares of sA = s1A . . . snqA , where sjA = rjA|Z′j . All the CPAl compute shares of sy(sA)
from those of sA and then perform the Reconstruct protocol of a conditional VSS scheme to agree on sy(sA).
Coming next, the CPAl ∈ σA1 compute the error pattern eˆ from sy(sB) and sy(sA) and update the first share of
sA XOR-ing it with eˆ (i.e., key reconciliation is achieved by acting on a single share). We denote the corrected
key by sˆA = sA ⊕ eˆ. Using hEV, all the CPAl compute their shares of hEV(sˆA) and reconstruct it via the
Reconstruct protocol of a conditional VSS scheme. Then, each CPAl ∈ σA1 checks that hEV(sˆA) = hEV(sB).
Otherwise, it aborts the protocol.
6. Privacy amplification. In case of not aborting, all the CPAl compute their shares of Alice’s final key SA =
hPA(sˆA). Similarly, if no abortion is notified, all the CPBl′ compute their shares of Bob’s final key SB = hPA(sB).
2. Secret key length formula
a. AC, AN and PC corruption models for the QKD modules
In this section, we particularise the extractable key length (Eq. (A9)) for the decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol of
Sec. E 1. As seen in the main text, this formula is tight within the AC, AN and PC corruption models for the QKD
modules, and we maintain the asterisks to emphasize that we refer to well-defined/unique quantities consistently held
by honest (and/or passively corrupted) units. To evaluate Eq. (A9), it suffices to derive the explicit formula of hj∗ε .
Assuming perfect state preparation, the entropic uncertainty relation [44] gives
Hεmin(s
h∗
B |E) ≥ nh,L∗11,Z
[
1− h
(
φh,U∗11,Z
)]
, (E3)
where h(·) is the binary entropy function, nh,L∗11,Z stands for a lower bound on nh∗11,Z and φh,U∗11,Z stands for an upper
bound on φh∗11,Z, n
j
11,Z and φ
j
11,Z being defined in Sec. E 1. From the definition of the smooth min-entropies, it follows
that ε is upper-bounded by the sum of the error probabilities of the estimates of nh,L∗11,Z and φ
h,U∗
11,Z .
Eq. (E3) implies that, for all j = 1, . . . , nq, one should define
hj∗ε = n
j,L∗
11,Z
[
1− h
(
φj,U∗11,Z
)]
, (E4)
18
which indeed determines a lower bound on Hεmin(s
j∗
B |E) if the j-th QKD pair delivers faithful protocol information.
Putting it all together, the extractable key length of the protocol in Sec. E 1 reads
l∗ =
⌊
min
j
{
nj,L∗11,Z
[
1− h(φj,U∗11,Z)
]
− ∣∣sy∗(sj∗B )∣∣}− log2( 1ˆcor2PAδ
)⌋
, (E5)
where we recall that |sy∗(sj∗B )| is the size of the j-th EC syndrome, ˆcor is the correctness parameter, PA is the error
probability of the privacy amplification and δ > 0. Also, as shown in Sec. A, the above key length is sec-secret for all
sec = ˆsec + AU, (E6)
where ˆsec ≥ 2ε+ δ + PA and AU is the error probability of the authentication, which is pre-determined by the
parties and depends on the corruption model of the CP units (see the Results section in the main text).
Explicit expressions of nj,L∗11,Z and φ
j,U∗
11,Z in terms of the observables of the protocol are given in the next section,
together with an upper bound on the smooth-parameter ε.
b. PN corruption model for the QKD modules
Similarly, the tighter secret key length formula valid for the PN corruption model is
l ≤
⌊
min
v
nq∑
j 6=v
{
nj,L11,Z
[
1− h(φj,U11,Z)
]
− ∣∣sy(sjB)∣∣}− log2( 1ˆcor2PAδnq−1
)⌋
, (E7)
with sec = ˆsec +AU and ˆsec ≥ (nq − 1)(2ε+ δ) + PA. Again, AU is pre-determined by Alice and Bob, and depends
on the corruption model of the CP units as established in the main text.
3. Parameter estimation
Here, we compute the bounds nj,L∗11,Z (n
j,L
11,Z) and φ
j,U∗
11,Z (φ
j,U
11,Z) that enter the secret key length, Eq. (E5) (Eq. (E7)).
Since the analysis below is common for every j = 1, . . . , nq, for simplicity of notation we drop the QKD pair index
j and refer to any of the QKD pairs. Also, we drop the asterisks for readability. PE is divided into two steps. In a
first step, we use the observables of the protocol to calculate bounds on the number S11,X (E11,X) of single-photon
successes (errors) in X = ∪a,bXa,b. For this purpose, we apply the decoy-state bounds presented in [43], although a
slightly simpler technique is used to estimate the expected sizes of the sets X a,b given their realisations (see Sec. G).
In a second step, since PE is only performed with the basis X data in the protocol (see Sec. E 1), we use basis-
indistinguishability arguments for the single-photon contributions and standard results from large deviation theory
to compute a lower bound on n11,Z and an upper bound on φ11,Z given the former bounds on S11,X and E11,X.
a. SL11,X, E
U
11,X
Let A = {µ, ν, ω} be the set of intensities that the parties use when they select the basis X, such that µ > ν > ω,
and let pµ, pν and pω be the corresponding probabilities. Also, let us introduce a list V = {(vi, v′i)}9i=1 of pairs of
vectors given by:
(v1, v
′
1) = ([µ, ν, µ, ν], [µ, ω, µ, ω]) , (v2, v
′
2) = ([µ, ν, µ, ν], [µ, ω, ν, ω]) , (v3, v
′
3) = ([µ, ν, µ, ν], [ν, ω, µ, ω]) ,
(v4, v
′
4) = ([µ, ν, µ, ν], [ν, ω, ν, ω]) , (v5, v
′
5) = ([µ, ν, µ, ω], [µ, ω, ν, ω]) , (v6, v
′
6) = ([µ, ν, µ, ω], [ν, ω, ν, ω]) ,
(v7, v
′
7) = ([µ, ω, µ, ν], [ν, ω, µ, ω]) , (v8, v
′
8) = ([µ, ω, µ, ν], [ν, ω, ν, ω]) , (v9, v
′
9) = ([µ, ω, µ, ω], [ν, ω, ν, ω]) .
(E8)
Then, the lower bound SL11,X is given by [43]
SL11,X =
⌊
max
(vi,v′i)∈V
{
τ11
c11
(
Jviv′i − Γviv′i
)}⌋
(E9)
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except with probability at most 11,X =
∑
a,b a,b, for a series of error terms {a,b}a,b∈A specified by the parties, and
some specific quantities τ11, c11, Jvv′ , and Γvv′ that we define in what follows. First,
τnm =
1
n!m!
∑
a,b∈A
e−(a+b)anbm pa,b,X, (E10)
where pa,b,X stands for the probability of a basis X coincidence with intensity settings a ∈ A for Alice and b ∈ A
for Bob. That is, pa,b,X = papbq
2
X. Regarding c11, Jvv′ , and Γvv′ , we distinguish two cases depending on the sign of
(a0 + a1)/(a
′
0 + a
′
1) − (b0 + b1)/(b′0 + b′1), where for convenience we use the generic notation v = [a0, a1, b0, b1] and
v′ = [a′0, a
′
1, b
′
0, b
′
1] for the pairs of vectors in the list V.
Case 1: (a0 + a1)/(a
′
0 + a
′
1) > (b0 + b1)/(b
′
0 + b
′
1).
In this case, the definitions are
cnm = (b
2
0 − b21)(a0 − a1)(a′0n − a′1n)(b′0m − b′1m)− (b′02 − b′12)(a′0 − a′1)(an0 − an1 )(bm0 − bm1 ), (E11)
Jvv′ = (b
2
0 − b21)(a0 − a1)Gv′ − (b′02 − b′12)(a′0 − a′1)Gv, (E12)
with
Gv = |X˜ a0,b0 |+ |X˜ a1,b1 | − |X˜ a0,b1 | − |X˜ a1,b0 |, (E13)
,
Gv′ = |X˜ a′0,b′0 |+ |X˜ a′1,b′1 | − |X˜ a′0,b′1 | − |X˜ a′1,b′0 | (E14)
and |X˜ a,b| = ea+b|X a,b|/pa,b,X.
Lastly,
Γvv′ = (b
2
0−b21)(a0−a1)(Γˆa′0,b′0 +Γˆa′1,b′1 +Γˆa′0,b′1 +Γˆa′1,b′0)+(b′0
2−b′12)(a′0−a′1)(Γa0,b0 +Γa1,b1 +Γa0,b1 +Γa1,b0), (E15)
where Γˆa,b = e
a+b∆ˆ(|X a,b|, a,b)/pa,b,X and Γa,b = ea+b∆(|X a,b|, a,b)/pa,b,X. The functions ∆ˆ(x, y) and ∆(x, y) are
defined in Sec. G. There, we explain the technique we use to relate the observed set sizes, |X a,b|, with their expected
values, in order to set statistical bounds on the latter.
Case 2: (a0 + a1)/(a
′
0 + a
′
1) ≤ (b0 + b1)/(b′0 + b′1).
For this case,
cnm = (a0 − a1)(b0 − b1)(a′0 − a′1)(b′0 − b′1)(a0 + a1 − a′0 − a′1), (E16)
Jvv′ = (a
2
0 − a21)(b0 − b1)Gv′ − (a′02 − a′12)(b′0 − b′1)Gv, (E17)
and
Γvv′ = (a
2
0−a21)(b0−b1)(Γˆa′0,b′0 +Γˆa′1,b′1 +Γˆa′0,b′1 +Γˆa′1,b′0)+(a′0
2−a′12)(b′0−b′1)(Γa0,b0 +Γa1,b1 +Γa0,b1 +Γa1,b0), (E18)
where the definitions of Gv, Gv′ , Γˆa,b and Γa,b are the same as in Case 1.
Coming next, we compute an upper bound EU11,X on E11,X. For this, let us introduce the list of vectors W =
{[a0, a1, b0, b1] | a0 > a1, b0 > b1, a0, a1, b0, b1 ∈ A}. Then, the upper bound EU11,X is given by [43]
EU11,X =
⌈
max
v∈W
{
τ11(Fv − Γv)
(a0 − a1)(b0 − b1)
}⌉
, (E19)
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except with probability at most ′11,X =
∑
a,b 
′
a,b, for a series of error terms
{
′a,b
}
a,b∈A
specified by the parties and
some specific quantities Fv, and Γv that we define in what follows:
Fv = e˜
a0,b0 + e˜a1,b1 − e˜a0,b1 − e˜a1,b0 (E20)
with e˜a,b = ea+bea,b/pa,b,X, and
Γv = −Γ′a0,b0 − Γ′a1,b1 − Γˆ′a0,b1 − Γˆ′a1,b0 (E21)
with Γ′a,b = ea+b∆(ea,b, ′a,b)/pa,b,X and Γˆ
′
a,b = e
a+b∆ˆ(ea,b, 
′
a,b)/pa,b,X. Also, we remind the reader that, for every
a, b ∈ A, ea,b is the observed number of bit errors in the set X a,b.
b. n11,Z, φ11,Z
Let N11,Z (N11,X) be the number of rounds where both Alice and Bob sent single photons and used the basis Z (X).
Of course, N11 = N11,Z +N11,X is the overall number of rounds where a basis match occurred and both parties sent
single photons. In the absence of state preparation flaws, the quantum states sent by Alice and Bob that contain single
photons on both sides are basis independent, meaning that Eve cannot distinguish in which basis they are prepared.
As a consequence, the probability that Charles declares a successful BSM cannot depend on the basis choice. Thus,
given the number S11,X of rounds where both parties sent single photons in the basis X and Charles declared a
successful BSM, one can estimate the corresponding number for the basis Z, S11,Z, via Serfling’s inequality [45]. Of
course, this requires the knowledge of N11,Z and N11,X as well. Precisely,
P
(
S11,Z ≤ N11,Z
(
S11,X
N11,X
)
− (N11,Z +N11,X)×Υ (N11,Z, N11,X, ε)
)
≤ ε (E22)
holds for any 0 < ε < 1 if we choose the deviation term Υ(N11,Z, N11,X, ε) to be defined by the function
Υ(x, y, z) =
√
(x+ 1) ln(z−1)/(2y(x+ y)). (E23)
For simplicity, we shall set a common error probability, ε = S, for each usage of Serfling’s inequality in this section.
Note that, as the quantities N11,Z, N11,X, and S11,X are not known, one should derive statistical bounds on them
and assume the worst-case scenario, i.e., the one that minimises the value of S11,Z. For the first two quantities one
can use the standard Chernoff bound [46], as their expected values are known to be µ11,Z = E [N11,Z] = Nq
2
Zp
2
1|λ
and µ11,X = E [N11,X] = Nq
2
X
(
pµp1|µ + pνp1|ν + pωp1|ω
)2
, where pn|a stands for the poissonian photon-number
distribution with mean value a. Importantly, these expected values do not rely on the assumption of a particular
channel model, but only on Alice’s and Bob’s state preparation process. Regarding, for instance, N11,Z, we have that
P
(
N11,Z > N
U
11,Z
)
< ε′ and P
(
N11,Z < N
L
11,Z
)
< ε′′ respectively hold for any ε′, ε′′ ∈ (0, 1) if we set
NU11,Z = min {dµZ + ∆U(µZ, ε′)e , N} and NL11,Z = max {bµZ −∆L(µZ, ε′′)c , 0} , (E24)
where the deviation functions are given by [46]
∆U(x, y) =
ln y−1
2
(
1 +
√
1 +
8x
ln y−1
)
and ∆L(x, y) =
√
2x ln y−1. (E25)
As usual, the superscript “L” (“U”) stands for “lower” (“upper”) bound, and the bounds on N11,X are obtained
substituting µZ by µX in Eq. (E24). For simplicity, we shall set a common error probability, C, for each usage of the
Chernoff bound, as we already did for Serfling’s inequality. In particular, we set ε′ = ε′′ = C.
Regarding S11,X, a lower bound S
L
11,X was already derived in the first part of this appendix, and the corresponding
error probability is denoted by 11,X. Coming next, we update the claim of Eq. (E22) by replacing N11,Z, N11,X and
S11,X with the appropriate bounds minimising S11,Z, and by adding the corresponding error terms on the right-hand
side. This yields P
(
S11,Z ≤ SL11,Z
) ≤ S + 11,X + 2C, for
SL11,Z = max
{⌊
NL11,Z
(
SL11,X
NU11,X
)
− (NL11,Z +NU11,X)×Υ (NL11,Z, NU11,X, S)
⌋
, 0
}
. (E26)
21
Finally, using Serfling’s inequality [45] one can easily relate the lower bound on the number n11,Z of single-photon
successes in the random sample Z ′ ⊂ Z, with the lower bound on the number S11,Z of single-photon successes in the
original set Z (see Sec. E 1). Already incorporating Eq. (E26), it follows that P (n11,Z ≤ nL11,Z) ≤ 2S + 11,X + 2C
for
nL11,Z = max
{⌊
M
(
SL11,Z
|Z| − Λ (|Z| ,M, S)
)⌋
, 0
}
, (E27)
where Λ(x, y, z) =
√
(x− y + 1) ln(z−1)/(2xy) and M is again the size of Z ′, which defines the post-processing block
size (i.e., the size of the sifted keys).
In the derivation above, we used a basis indistinguishability argument to relate the ratio S11,Z/N11,Z to the ratio
S11,X/N11,X via Serfling’s inequality [45]. The same argument also relates the ratio e11,Z/n11,Z to the ratio E11,X/S11,X,
where e11,Z (E11,X) denotes the number of single-photon phase errors (bit errors) in the rounds indexed by Z ′
(X = ∪a,bX a,b). Precisely,
P
(
e11,Z ≥ n11,Z
(
E11,X
S11,X
)
+ (S11,X + n11,Z)×Υ (n11,Z, S11,X, S)
)
≤ S (E28)
holds, where the deviation function Υ(x, y, z) is defined in Eq. (E22). Again, the quantities n11,Z, S11,X and E11,X
are not known, in such a way that adequate bounds should be used instead. On the one side, a lower bound on n11,Z
was presented in the previous subsection, and the relevant bounds on S11,X and E11,X were derived in the first part
of the appendix. Using these bounds and their respective error probabilities, one can update the claim of Eq. (E28)
as P
(
e11,Z ≥ eU11,Z
) ≤ 3S + 11,X + ′11,X + 2C, where
eU11,Z = min
{⌈
nL11,Z
(
EU11,X
SL11,X
)
+
(
SL11,X + n
L
11,Z
)×Υ (nL11,Z, SL11,X, S)
⌉
, nL11,Z
}
. (E29)
To finish with, note that the single-photon phase error rate is, by definition, given by φ11,Z = e11,Z/n11,Z. Thus, it
follows that P
(
φ11,Z ≥ φU11,Z
) ≤ 3S + 11,X + ′11,X + 2C for
φU11,Z =
eU11,Z
nL11,Z
, (E30)
where nL11,Z is given by Eq. (E27) and e
U
11,Z is given by Eq. (E29).
From the above PE procedure, it follows that the smooth parameter ε (see Sec. E 2) is upper-bounded as
ε ≤ 3S + 11,X + ′11,X + 2C. (E31)
4. Authentication cost
Here, we estimate the secret key bits consumed for authentication purposes in the MDI-QKD protocol of Sec. E 1,
assuming the authentication scheme presented in Sec. B of this Supplementary Information.
In general, as explained in the main text, the authentication cost reads
lAU = R
2 × |k| (E32)
for every corruption model of the CP units, where R is the common size of the sets σA1 and σ
B
1 (specified in Table 1 of
the main text for each model), and |k| is the number of secret bits of each key pool. Let us now estimate |k|. For this
purpose, let {∣∣mjA∣∣}nqj=1 and |mB| be the lengths of the messages respectively sent by Alice and Bob in the MDI-QKD
protocol of Sec. E 1 (where nq is the required number of QKD pairs, which depends on the corruption model of the
QKD modules). Then, it is required that
|k| ≥
nq∑
j=1
⌈
log2
(
2
∣∣mjA∣∣
γAU
)⌉
+
⌈
log2
(
2|mB|
γAU
)⌉
(E33)
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secret key bits at least, assuming a common error probability, γAU, for every authenticated message. This is so
because the right-hand side of Eq. (E33) defines the amount of secret bits that are consumed per pair (CPAl ,CPBl′ )
with CPAl ∈ σA1 and CPBl′ ∈ σB1 , for the encryption of the authentication tags. Following the protocol description of
Sec. E 1, we have ∣∣mjA∣∣ = ∣∣aj |cj ∣∣+ ∣∣rjA|cj ,X∣∣,
|mB| = |sZ′ |+ |sy(sB)|+ |hEV(sB)|+ |hEV description|+ |hPA description| , (E34)
where the expected sizes of aj |cj and rjA|cj ,X for a typical channel model are given in Sec. E 6, |sZ′ | =
∑nq
j=1
∣∣rjA|cj ,Z∣∣
(the expected sizes of all rjA|cj ,Z being given in Sec. E 6 too), the size of the syndrome |sy(sB)| depends on the
EC protocol (and a typical model is given in the Discussion of the main text), |hEV(sB)| = dlog2(2/ˆcor)e bits,
|hEV description| = 2dlog2(2/ˆcor)e bits and |hPA description| = Mnq+l−1 bits, l denoting the extractable key length,
given by Eq. (E5) (Eq. (E7)) for the AC, AN and PC corruption models (PN corruption model) for the QKD modules.
To finish with, we recall that the pre-agreed total error probability of the authentication, AU, is related to γAU via
AU ≥ (tc + 1)2× (nq + 1)γAU for active corruption of the CP units, and via AU ≥ (nq + 1)γAU for passive corruption,
where we remind the reader that tc is the threshold number of corrupted CP units per party.
5. Calculation of N and Etol for the simulations
Here, we derive proper values for the number of transmission rounds per QKD pair, N , and for the threshold bit
error rate of the EC protocol, Etol, based on respective restrictions on the abortion probabilities of the sifting step
and the error verification step. The analysis relies on a typical channel model presented in Sec. E 6.
a. N
Let us impose a common abortion probability γsift/nq for each sifting step (nq of them in total). That is, we demand
that P (|Zj | < M) ≤ γsift/nq for all j = 1, . . . , nq, where |Zj | is the set of detection events when both parties use basis
Z and M is the pre-specified size of the sifted keys (i.e., the block size). Using the Chernoff’s inequality [46], this
condition is met if we set the number of signals transmitted per module in each QKD pair to N = ζ(M,Gλ,λZ,Z, γsift/nq),
where
ζ(x, y, z) =
⌈
x
y
+
ln (1/z)
y
[
1 +
√
1 +
2x
ln (1/z)
]⌉
, (E35)
and Gλ,λZ,Z is the probability that any given round of the QKD session between QKDAj and QKDBj contributes to Zj .
An expression of Gλ,λZ,Z for a typical channel model is given in Sec. E 6.
b. Etol
Following the MDI-QKD protocol of Sec. E 1, the reconciliation of sA with sB is performed separately on each s
j
A.
If, for simplicity, one assumes that the EC protocol corrects up to a fraction Etol of bit errors (and no more) with
certainty, either Ej ≤ Etol for all j or the (single) EV step aborts, where Ej denotes the actual error rate between sjA
and sjB. Thus, applying Chernoff’s inequality [46], P (EV aborts) ≤ γEC holds for any γEC ∈ (0, 1) if
Etol = min
{
1, Eλ,λZ,Z +
∆U(E
λ,λ
Z,ZM,γEC/nq)
M
}
(E36)
where Eλ,λZ,Z is the expected bit error rate for the basis Z and the common intensity λ, and the deviation function
∆U(x, y) is defined in Eq. (E25). An expression of E
λ,λ
Z,Z for a typical channel model is given in Sec. E 6.
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6. Channel model
In this section, we derive expressions for the expected values of the observables of the protocol, considering the
setup illustrated in Fig. (4). To begin with, let us elaborate on the mathematical models we use.
a. Models
1. Laser sources. Alice’s and Bob’s photon sources emit PR-WCP of the form
ρτ =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
|τ〉〈τ | dγ, (E37)
where |τ〉 = exp (τa† − τ∗a) |0〉 is a coherent state, with amplitude τ = |τ |eiγ ∈ C. Here, a† (a) and |0〉 are the
creation (annihilation) operator and the vacuum state for mode a, such that a Fock state with n photons in this
mode is given by |n〉 = a†n/n!|0〉.
2. Channel and detector loss. An effective beam-splitter with transmittance η = ηchηdet is used to jointly
model channel loss (ηch) and detector loss (ηdet) on each side. The transformation reads
p† −→ √η r† +
√
1− η s†,
q† −→ √η s† −
√
1− η r†, (E38)
where the quantum signal enters through the input port p, a vacuum state enters through the input port q, the
output port r leads to unit detection efficiency detectors, and the output port s represents channel and detection
loss. In turn, ηch = 10
−αattL/10, αatt being the attenuation coefficient of the channel (in dB/km), and L being
the transmission length between each party and the central node (in km).
3. Basis choice and polarization misalignment. Let a†h (a
†
v) denote the creation operator of a photon with
horizontal (vertical) polarization in a pre-fixed basis Z. For each party, the selection of the basis setting θ ∈
{0, pi/4} and the occurrence of a polarization misalignment δmis > 0 jointly transform a†h and a†v according to
the following unitary operation:
a†h −→ cos(θ + δmis)a†h + sin(θ + δmis)a†v,
a†v −→ cos(θ + δmis)a†v − sin(θ + δmis)a†h. (E39)
In short, for any given δmis, setting θ = 0 (θ = pi/4) in Eq. (E39) jointly models that the party selected basis Z
(X) and a polarization misalignment δmis occurred in the channel.
4. Photo-detectors. Threshold detectors are considered, meaning that each of them is modeled with a POVM
consisting of only two elements: {Eno click, Eclick}. As the detector loss is already accounted for in the chan-
nel model, the POVM here must describe unit efficiency photo-detectors, but having a non-zero dark count
probability pd. That is,
Eno click = (1− pd)|0〉〈0|, Eclick = 1 − Eno click. (E40)
The operator 11 denotes the identitiy operator in the photon-number basis, i.e., 11 =
∑∞
n=0 |n〉〈n|.
b. Relevant experimental parameters
First of all, let us introduce some convenient notation. At every round of the protocol, θA (θB) ∈ {0, pi/4} denotes
Alice’s (Bob’s) basis setting, where, as usual, 0 (pi/4) stands for basis Z (X). Similarly, i and j ∈ {1, 2} respectively
denote Alice’s and Bob’s polarization states, such that, for basis Z (X), 1 means “h” (“+”) and 2 means “v” (“-”).
Regarding the photo-detectors, they are numbered by w ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} as shown in Fig. 4. Also, for each photo-detector
w, it is convenient to introduce an “arm index” sw ∈ {1, 2} specifying whether it is on the right arm (sw = 1) or
the left arm (sw = 2) of the detection scheme, and another “polarization index” kw ∈ {1, 2} specifying whether
they detect the horizontal (kw = 1) or the vertical (kw = 2) component of the pulses coming from the polarizing
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FIG. 4: Schematic of the decoy-state MDI-QKD setup. Alice (Bob) holds a laser source that emits PR-WCPs in any
of the four BB84 states, defined by a polarization setting i (j) ∈ {1, 2} and a basis setting θA (θB) ∈ {0, pi/4}. An
intensity modulator (IM) selects the amplitude |α| (|β|) of Alice’s (Bob’s) laser pulse. The overall one-sided
efficiency is denoted by η = ηchηdet, where ηdet is the detector efficiency (set to a common value for all the
photo-detectors) and ηch = 10
−αL/10 is the transmission efficiency, α (dB/km) being the attenuation coefficient of
the channel and L (km) being the common transmission length between each party and the central node. The angle
δA (δB) ≥ 0 denotes the polarization misalignment occurring in the left (right) arm of the setup (denoted by δmis in
Eq. (E39)) and the symbol “⊕” stands for polarizing beam-splitter (PBS). Blue color is used for the intensities
|ξi,jw |2 that arrive at the detectors (w ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}). Each detector has an “arm index” sw ∈ {1, 2} that specifies
whether it is on the right arm (sw = 1) or the left arm (sw = 2) of the detection scheme, and a polarization index
kw ∈ {1, 2} specifying whether it detects the horizontal (kw = 1) or the vertical (kw = 2) component of the pulses
coming from the PBSs. For simplicity, this last index is not shown in the figure.
beam-splitters (PBSs) in Fig. 4.
Let us assume for the moment that Alice’s (Bob’s) laser emits pure coherent states with complex amplitude α (β)
in the BB84 state defined by i and θA (j and θB). The quantum state at the input port of the detectors also factors
as the product of four coherent states, |φdet〉 = |ξi,j1 〉|ξi,j2 〉|ξi,j3 〉|ξi,j4 〉, ξi,jw denoting the incoming amplitude to detector
w for settings i and j (the dependence on the intensity settings, α and β, and the basis settings, θA and θB, is omitted
for readability). Precisely, it can be shown that
ξi,jw =
√
η
2
[
αΘA,i,kw + (−1)swβΘB,j,kw
]
, (E41)
where η = ηchηdet is the overall one-sided efficiency (accounting for both the transmission efficiency of the channel, ηch,
and the detection efficiency of Charles’ detectors, ηdet), and ΘA,l,m (ΘB,l,m) is the (l,m)-th element of the matrix ΘA
(ΘB), which incorporates Alice’s (Bob’s) measurement setting, θA (θB), and the polarization misalignment occurring
in her (his) side of the channel, δA ≥ 0 (δB ≥ 0):
ΘA =
[
cos(θA + δA) sin(θA + δA)
− sin(θA + δA) cos(θA + δA)
]
and ΘB =
[
cos(θB + δB) sin(θB + δB)
− sin(θB + δB) cos(θB + δB)
]
. (E42)
The cases of interest are θA = θB = 0 (basis Z match) and θA = θB = pi/4 (basis X match). If, without loss of
generality, we set α = |α| and β = |β|eiγ , the intensities (squared modulus of the amplitudes) at the detectors read
|ξi,jw |
2
=
η
2
[
|α|2Θ2A,i,kw + |β|2Θ2B,j,kw + (−1)sw2|α||β|ΘA,i,kwΘB,j,kw cos γ
]
, w ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. (E43)
Since a success at the central node is heralded by the click of exactly two detectors referred to orthogonal polarizations,
the set of possible successful events reads
Ω = {(1, 2), (3, 4), (1, 4), (2, 3)} . (E44)
As an example, let us compute the probability P i,j(1,2) of the successful event (1, 2). This probability factors as
P i,j(1,2) = p(3 and 4 do not click)× p(1 and 2 click). (E45)
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Then, from our detector model and the poissonian statistics of coherent states, we have that
p(3 and 4 do not click) = (1− pd)2e−(|ξ
i,j
3 |2+|ξi,j4 |2),
p(1 and 2 click) =
(
1− e−|ξi,j1 |2
)(
1− e−|ξi,j2 |2
)
+
+ pd
[(
1− e−|ξi,j1 |2
)
e−|ξ
i,j
2 |2 +
(
1− e−|ξi,j2 |2
)
e−|ξ
i,j
1 |2
]
+ p2de
−(|ξi,j1 |2+|ξi,j2 |2). (E46)
Putting both factors together and generalising the expression to an arbitrary successful event (u, v), one obtains
P i,j(u,v) = (1− pd)2 exp
(
−
∑
w 6=u,v
|ξi,jw |2
)[
1− (1− pd)
(
e−|ξ
i,j
u |2 + e−|ξ
i,j
v |2
)
+ (1− pd)2e−(|ξ
i,j
u |2+|ξi,jv |2)
]
, (E47)
or, more conveniently,
P i,j(u,v)
(1− pd)2 = exp
− ∑
w 6=u,v
|ξi,jw |2
−(1−pd)
exp
−∑
w 6=u
|ξi,jw |2
+ exp
−∑
w 6=v
|ξi,jw |2
+(1−pd)2 exp(−∑
w
|ξi,jw |2
)
.
(E48)
Recalling that P i,j(u,v) was computed assuming pure coherent states, one needs to average over phase values in order to
derive the resulting probability for PR-WCPs, which we denote by pi,j(u,v),α,β,θA,θB =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
P i,j(u,v) dγ. For convenience,
this notation explicitly shows that, in any round of the protocol, the probability of a successful detection event
(u, v) ∈ Ω depends on all the protocol settings. The explicit calculation of this integral yields
pi,j(u,v),α,β,θA,θB
(1− pd)2 = exp
−η
2
∑
w 6=u,v
(|α|2Θ2A,i,kw + |β|2Θ2B,j,kw)
 I0,sym
η|α||β| ∑
w 6=u,v
(−1)sw+1ΘA,i,kwΘB,j,kw

− (1− pd) exp
−η
2
∑
w 6=u
(|α|2Θ2A,i,kw + |β|2Θ2B,j,kw)
 I0,sym
η|α||β|∑
w 6=u
(−1)sw+1ΘA,i,kwΘB,j,kw

− (1− pd) exp
−η
2
∑
w 6=v
(|α|2Θ2A,i,kw + |β|2Θ2B,j,kw)
 I0,sym
η|α||β|∑
w 6=v
(−1)sw+1ΘA,i,kwΘB,j,kw

+ (1− pd)2 exp
[
−η
2
∑
w
(|α|2Θ2A,i,kw + |β|2Θ2B,j,kw)
]
I0,sym
(
η|α||β|
∑
w
(−1)sw+1ΘA,i,kwΘB,j,kw
)
,
(E49)
where we have introduced the function I0,sym(x) = [I0(x)+I0(−x)]/2 = 12pi
∫ 2pi
0
ex cos γdγ, I0 being the modified Bessel
function of the first kind.
From Eq. (E49), one can compute the probability Qα,βθA,θB that any given round yields a successful BSM at the
central node when Alice (Bob) uses basis θA (θB) and intensity |α|2 (|β|2),
Qα,βθA,θB =
1
4
∑
(u,v)∈Ω
[
p1,1(u,v),α,β,θA,θB + p
1,2
(u,v),α,β,θA,θB
+ p2,1(u,v),α,β,θA,θB + p
2,2
(u,v),α,β,θA,θB
]
, θA, θB ∈ {0, pi/4}. (E50)
Similarly, one can compute the bit error rates, Eα,β0,0 and E
α,β
pi
4 ,
pi
4
, for the basis coincidences, given by
Qα,β0,0 E
α,β
0,0 =
1
4
∑
(u,v)∈Ω
[
p1,1(u,v),α,β,0,0 + p
2,2
(u,v),α,β,0,0
]
and
Qα,βpi
4 ,
pi
4
Eα,βpi
4 ,
pi
4
=
1
4
 ∑
(u,v)∈Ω1
[
p1,1(u,v),α,β,pi4 ,
pi
4
+ p2,2(u,v),α,β,pi4 ,
pi
4
]
+
∑
(u,v)∈Ω2
[
p1,2(u,v),α,β,pi4 ,
pi
4
+ p2,1(u,v),α,β,pi4 ,
pi
4
] ,(E51)
where Ω1 = {(1, 4), (2, 3)} and Ω2 = {(1, 2), (3, 4)}. Note that only the polarization settings h,h and v,v (i.e.,
i = j = 1 and i = j = 2) contribute to the basis Z bit error rate. This is so because, for these rounds, Bob flips his bit
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irrespectively of the successful outcome of the BSM. On the contrary, for the basis X bit error rate, the post-selection
of |ψ−〉 in the BSM (events (1, 4) and (2, 3)) entails a bit flip, while the post-selection of |ψ+〉 (events (1, 2) and
(3, 4)) does not, thus leading to the definition of the bit error rate given in Eq. (E51).
Finally, we write down the expected values of the observables required for the simulations, according to the channel
model above. For this purpose, we introduce the quantities Gλ,λZ,Z = q
2
ZQ
√
λ,
√
λ
0,0 , G
a,b
X,X = q
2
XpapbQ
√
a,
√
b
pi
4 ,
pi
4
, Gλ,bZ,X =
qZqXpbQ
√
λ,
√
b
0,pi4
, Ga,λX,Z = qZqXpaQ
√
a,
√
λ
pi
4 ,0
, Eλ,λZ,Z = E
√
λ,
√
λ
0,0 and E
a,b
X,X = E
√
a,
√
b
pi
4 ,
pi
4
, with a, b ∈ A = {µ, ν, ω}. From these
quantities, it follows that
E
[∣∣Zj |] = Gλ,λZ,ZN,
E
[
Ej
]
= Eλ,λZ,Z ,
E
[∣∣X a,bj ∣∣] = Ga,bX,XN,
E
[
eja,b
]
= Ea,bX,XG
a,b
X,XN,
E
[|aj |cj |] = (Gλ,λZ,Z + ∑
a,b∈A
Ga,bX,X +
∑
b∈A
Gλ,bZ,X +
∑
a∈A
Ga,λX,Z
)
2N bits,
E
[∣∣rjA|cj ,X∣∣] = ( ∑
a,b∈A
Ga,bX,X +
∑
a∈A
Ga,λX,Z
)
N bits and
E
[∣∣rjA|cj ,Z∣∣] = (Gλ,λZ,Z +∑
b∈A
Gλ,bZ,X
)
N bits. (E52)
We recall that N is the number of signals transmitted per module in each QKD pair.
Appendix F: Decoy-state BB84
To further illustrate the applicability of the results in the main text, we combine Protocol with the standard
decoy-state BB84 scheme [37, 47–49] with three common decoy intensities per basis.
1. QKD protocol
Again, although the protocol description below assumes that the corrupted devices do not deviate from the
protocol, the security against actively misbehaving corrupted devices is established in the main text. As for the
MDI-QKD protocol, we define the sets σA1 = {CPAl}Rl=1 and σB1 =
{
CPBl′
}R
l′=1, where we recall that R is given in Ta-
ble 1 of the main text for each corruption model of the CP units. For instance, R = 2tc+1 in the AC corruption model.
For j = 1, . . . , nq, QKDAj creates a trio of strings (r
j
A, k
j
A, a
j). The string rjA ∈ {0, 1}N is fully random
(polarization bits string). For all i = 1, . . . , N , kjA ∈ {Z,X}N verifies P
[
kjAi = ζ
]
= qζ with ζ ∈ {Z,X} (basis string),
and aj ∈ {µ, ν, ω}N (intensities string) verifies P [aji = a] = pa for a ∈ A, with A = {µ, ν, ω}. Similarly, QKDBj
creates its basis string kjB ∈ {Z,X}N verifying P
[
kjBi = ζ
]
= qζ with ζ ∈ {Z,X} and i = 1, . . . , N .
Let us now focus on a single QKD pair, say, the j-th one. For i ranging from 1 to N , steps (i) to (iii) are repeated.
(i) State preparation QKDAj prepares a PR-WCP with intensity a
j
i in the BB84 state defined by k
j
Ai
and rjAi .
(ii) Transmission QKDAj sends the state to QKDBj via the quantum channel.
(iii) Measurement QKDBj performs a measurement in basis k
j
Bi
and stores the outcome in a classical value
rjBi ∈ {0, 1, ∅}, where ∅ is the symbol produced when no signal is detected. If a multiple click takes place, Bob
assigns a random bit to this event.
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After the above quantum communication phase, the distributed QKD post-processing starts. Again, we focus on a
single QKD pair, say, the j-th one.
1. Distribution of data. Let rjA|X (rjA|Z) be the sub-string of rjA where QKDAj uses basis X (Z) for the encoding.
QKDAj communicates the trio (k
j
A, a
j , rjA|X) to every CPAl ∈ σA1 and uses the Share protocol of a conditional
VSS scheme to distribute shares of rjA|Z among them. Let cj be the string of detector clicks held by QKDBj ,
such that cji = 0 if r
j
Bi
= ∅ and cji = 1 otherwise, and let kBj |cj be the restriction of the basis string kBj
to the non-zero entries of cj . Also, let rjB|cj ,X (rjB|cj ,Z) be the restriction of rjB to the non-zero entries of cj
where QKDBj uses basis X (Z) for the measurements. QKDBj communicates the trio (c
j , kjB|cj , rjB|cj ,X) to every
CPBl′ ∈ σB1 and uses the Share protocol of a conditional VSS scheme to distribute shares of rjB|cj ,Z among them.
All the CPAl ∈ σA1 (CPBl′ ∈ σB1 ) perform a consistency test on (kjA, aj , rjA|X) ((cj , kjB|cj , rjB|cj ,X)).
2. Sifting. Every CPAl ∈ σA1 sends (kjA, aj , rjA|X) to every CPBl′ ∈ σB1 , which individually apply MV. Then, each
CPBl′ ∈ σB1 builds the index sets
Zj =
{
i|cji = 1, kjAi = k
j
Bi
= Z
}
and X aj =
{
i|cji = 1, kjAi = k
j
Bi
= X, aji = a
}
, (F1)
for all a ∈ A, and checks if the sifting condition ∣∣Zj∣∣ ≥M is met, for a pre-established threshold value M . If it
is not met, the CPBl′ ∈ σB1 abort the protocol. In case of not aborting, the CPBl′ ∈ σB1 units forward Zj to the
rest of the units, which apply MV. All together the CPBl′ perform a RBS protocol to select a random subsetZ ′j ⊆ Zj , of size M . Then, Bob’s units locally perform the sifting. Precisely, every CPBl′ builds its shares of
the sifted key sjB = r
j
B|Z′j from those of rjB|cj ,Z (discarding the data external to Z ′j).
3. Parameter estimation. For each a ∈ A, every CPBl′ ∈ σB1 unit builds the PE strings rjB|Xaj and rjA|Xaj from
the respective strings rjB|cj ,X and rjA|X, discarding the data external to X aj . Then, each of them computes the
numbers of bit errors
eja =
|Xaj |∑
k=1
rjAk
∣∣
Xaj
⊕ rjBk
∣∣
Xaj
, (F2)
for a ∈ A, where rjAk
∣∣
Xaj
(rjBk
∣∣
Xaj
) denotes the k-th bit of the corresponding string. Using |Zj | and the different∣∣X aj ∣∣ and eja (a ∈ A), every CPBl′ ∈ σB1 computes a lower bound on the number nj1,Z of single-photon successes
in Z ′j and an upper bound on the single-photon phase-error rate φj1,Z associated to the single-photon successes
in Z ′j .
Although the rest of the post-processing is identical to that of the MDI-QKD protocol (except from the fact that
no bit flips are required to correlate sA and sB), we include it here for completeness. The above steps 1 to 3 are
performed for all j = 1, . . . , nq. At this stage, every CPBl′ ∈ σB1 derives a lower bound l (given in the next section) on
the secret key length that can be extracted from the concatenated sifted key sB = s
1
B . . . s
nq
B via PA. If a CPBl′ ∈ σB1
finds l ≤ 0, it aborts the protocol.
4. RBS generation. If the protocol does not abort, every CPBl′ ∈ σB1 forwards l to the rest of Bob’s units, which
apply MV. All CPBl′ perform a RBS generation protocol to randomly select two 2-universal hash functions hEV
and hPA, respectively devoted to error verification (EV) and PA. Following [35], if Toeplitz matrices are used
for this purpose, 2dlog2(2/ˆcor)e (Mnq + l − 1) bits are required to specify hEV (hPA).
5. Information reconciliation Every CPBl′ computes its shares of (1) the concatenated syndromes string syB =
sy(s1B) . . . sy(s
nq
B ) and (2) the EV tag hEV,B = hEV(sB). All together, the CPBl′ reconstruct syB and hEV,B
via the Reconstruct protocol of a conditional VSS scheme (see the Methods section in the main text). Each
CPBl′ ∈ σB1 sends the following items to every CPAl ∈ σA1 :
1. The string sZ′ = sZ′1 . . . sZ′nq , where sZ′j specifies, say, the positions in r
j
A|Z that contribute to Z ′j .
2. The syndrome information sy(sB), together with the description of hEV and the EV tag hEV(sB).
3. The description of hPA.
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Each CPAl ∈ σA1 decides on all three items via MV and communicate sZ′ , hEV and hPA to the rest of Alice’s
units, which apply MV too. Then, they proceed as follows. Using sZ′ , all CPAl shrink their shares of rA|Z =
r1A|Z . . . rnqA |Z into shares of sA = s1A . . . snqA , where sjA = rjA|Z′j . All the CPAl compute shares of sy(sA) from
those of sA and then perform the Reconstruct protocol of a conditional VSS scheme to agree on sy(sA). Coming
next, the CPAl ∈ σA1 compute the error pattern eˆ from sy(sB) and sy(sA) and update the first share of sA
XOR-ing it with eˆ (i.e., key reconciliation is achieved by acting on a single share). We denote the corrected key
by sˆA = sA⊕ eˆ. Using hEV, all the CPAl compute their shares of hEV(sˆA) and reconstruct it via the Reconstruct
protocol of a conditional VSS scheme. Then, each CPAl ∈ σA1 checks that hEV(sˆA) = hEV(sB). Otherwise, it
aborts the protocol.
6. Privacy amplification. In case of not aborting, all the CPAl compute their shares of Alice’s final key SA =
hPA(sˆA). Similarly, if no abortion is notified, all the CPBl′ compute their shares of Bob’s final key SB = hPA(sB).
2. Secret key length formula
a. AC, AN and PC corruption models for the QKD modules
Here, we particularise the secret key length for the decoy-state BB84 protocol of Sec. F 1. The formula is tight
within the AC, AN and PC corruption models for the QKD modules and we maintain the asterisks to emphasize that
we refer to well-defined/unique quantities consistently held by honest (and/or passively corrupted) units. The analysis
is identical to the one for the MDI-QKD protocol, given in Sec. E 2, and we omit it here for simplicity. Precisely, the
extractable key length is
l∗ =
⌊
min
j
{
nj,L∗1,Z
[
1− h(φj,U∗1,Z )
]
− ∣∣sy∗(sj∗B )∣∣}− log2( 1ˆcor2PAδ
)⌋
, (F3)
where nh,L∗1,Z (φ
h,U∗
1,Z ) stands for a lower (upper) bound on n
h∗
1,Z (φ
h∗
1,Z), h(·) is the binary entropy function, |sy∗(sj∗B )|
is the size of the j-th EC syndrome, ˆcor is the correctness parameter, PA is the error probability of the privacy
amplification, and δ > 0. Also, as shown in Sec. A, the above key length is sec-secret for all
sec = ˆsec + AU (F4)
with ˆsec ≥ 2ε+ δ + PA, where ε is upper-bounded by the sum of the error probabilities of the estimates of nh,L∗1,Z
and φh,U∗1,Z , and AU is the pre-agreed total error probability of the authentication, which depends on the corruption
model of the CP units (see the Results section in the main text). Explicit expressions of nj,L∗1,Z and φ
j,U∗
1,Z in terms of
the observables of the protocol are given in the next section, together with an upper bound on the smooth-parameter
ε.
b. PN corruption model for the QKD modules
Within the PC corruption model, the following tighter key length formula holds,
l ≤
⌊
min
v
nq∑
j 6=v
{
nj,L1,Z
[
1− h(φj,U1,Z)
]
− ∣∣sy(sjB)∣∣}− log2( 1ˆcor2PAδnq−1
)⌋
, (F5)
where sec = ˆsec + AU with ˆsec ≥ (nq − 1)(2ε+ δ) + PA, and AU is again pre-agreed by Alice and Bob and depends
on the corruption model of the CP units. The analysis is again identical to that of Sec. E 2.
3. Parameter estimation
Here, we give the analytical bounds nj,L∗1,Z and φ
j,U∗
1,Z that enter Eq. (F3). These bounds were originally presented
in [37] and we include them here for completeness. Since the analysis is common for all j = 1, . . . , nq, we drop the
QKD pair index j and refer to any of the QKD pairs. In addition, we drop the asterisks for readability.
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The decoy-state bounds below require µ > ν + ω and ν > ω ≥ 0, where we recall that A = {µ, ν, ω} is the set of
intensity settings. In addition, let us introduce the decomposition Z ′ = ∪a∈AZ ′a, where Z ′a = {i ∈ Z ′|ai = a}. The
observed sizes of the sets Z ′a determine nL∗1,Z. Precisely, we have that for all H ∈ (0, 1), P
(
n1,Z < n
L
1,Z
)
< 3H holds
for
nL1,Z =
⌊
µτ1
µ(ν − ω)− (ν2 − ω2)
{
eν
pν
[∣∣Z ′ν∣∣− δ(M, H)]− eω
pω
[∣∣Z ′ω∣∣+ δ(M, H)]− ν2 − ω2
µ2
eµ
pµ
[∣∣Z ′µ∣∣+ δ(M, H)]}⌋,
(F6)
where τ1 = µe
−µpµ + νe−νpν + ωe−ωpω and δ(x, y) =
√
(x/2) ln y−1 is the deviation term that follows from
the use of Hoeffding’s inequality [50]. Such inequality is used three times in Eq. (F6) (with a common error
probability, H) to obtain adequate one-sided bounds on the expected values of
∣∣Z ′µ∣∣, ∣∣Z ′ν∣∣ and ∣∣Z ′ω∣∣, respec-
tively, given their realisations. Note that, for this task, one could also apply the inverse Chernoff-bound given in Sec. G.
Similarly,
∣∣X µ∣∣, ∣∣X ν∣∣ and ∣∣Xω∣∣ determine a lower bound on the number SL1,X of rounds in X = ∪a∈AX a where Alice
sent single photons. Precisely, P
(
S1,X < S
L
1,X
)
< 3H holds for
SL1,X =⌊
µτ1
µ(ν − ω)− (ν2 − ω2)
{
eν
pν
[∣∣X ν∣∣− δ (∣∣X ∣∣, H)]− eω
pω
[∣∣Xω∣∣+ δ (∣∣X ∣∣, H)]− ν2 − ω2
µ2
eµ
pµ
[∣∣X µ∣∣+ δ (∣∣X ∣∣, H)]}⌋,
(F7)
where we assumed a common error probability, H, for each usage of Hoeffding’s inequality [50] again.
Regarding the number E1,X of single-photon errors in X , it turns out that P
(
E1,X > E
U
1,X
)
< 2H holds for
EU1,X =
⌈
τ1
ν − ω
{
eν
pν
[
eν + δ(e, H)
]
− e
ω
pω
[
eω − δ(e, H)
]}⌉
, (F8)
where we recall that ea is the observed number of errors in X a (a ∈ A) and we defined e =
∑
a ea. Also, the
error probability 2H follows from the composition of two usages of Hoeffding’s inequality [50]. Finally, as we did
for the parameter estimation in the MDI-QKD protocol, we use Serfling’s inequality [45] to relate the number e1,Z
of single-photon errors in Z ′ with the number E1,X of single-photon errors in X . To be precise, it follows that
P
(
e1,Z > e
U
1,Z
)
< 8H + S holds for
eU1,Z = min
{⌈
nL1,Z
(
EU1,X
SL1,X
)
+
(
SL1,X + n
L
1,Z
)×Υ (nL1,Z, SL1,X, S)
⌉
, nL1,Z
}
, (F9)
where the deviation function Υ(x, y, z) is given by Eq. (E23) and S is the error probability of Serfling’s inequality [45].
Equivalently, the single-photon phase error rate φ1,Z verifies P
(
φ1,Z ≥ φU1,Z
) ≤ 8H + S for
φU1,Z =
eU1,Z
nL1,Z
, (F10)
where nL1,Z is given in Eq. (F6) and e
U
1,Z is given in Eq. (F9).
From the above PE procedure it follows that the smooth parameter ε (see Sec. F 2) is upper-bounded as
ε ≤ 8H + S. (F11)
4. Authentication cost
Here, we estimate the secret key bits consumed for authentication purposes in the BB84 protocol of Sec. F 1. The
procedure is identical to that of Sec. E 4, so we skip the details.
On the one hand, the pre-agreed total error probability of the authentication, AU, is related to the individual error
probability, γAU, via AU ≥ (tc + 1)2 × (nq + 1)γAU for active corruption of the CP units, and via AU ≥ (nq + 1)γAU
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for passive corruption, where we remind the reader that R is specified in Table 1 of the main text for every corruption
model, and tc (nq) is the threshold number of corrupted units per party (total number of QKD pairs).
On the other hand, the overall authentication cost, lAU, is also determined by the corruption model of the CP
units via R. Precisely, lAU = R
2 × |k| secret bits, where |k| stands for the size of the key pool pre-shared by each
pair (CPAl ,CPBl′ ) with CPAl ∈ σA1 and CPBl′ ∈ σB1 . A lower bound on |k| is given in Eq. (E33), determined by the
lengths {∣∣mjA∣∣}nqj=1 and |mB| of the messages respectively sent by Alice and Bob in the BB84 protocol of Sec. F 1.
Following the protocol description of Sec. F 1, we have∣∣mjA∣∣ = ∣∣kjA∣∣+ ∣∣aj∣∣+ ∣∣rjA|X∣∣,
|mB| = |sZ′ |+ |sy(sB)|+ |hEV(sB)|+ |hEV description|+ |hPA description| . (F12)
In the previous equation, kjA is a string of N bits, a
j is a string of N trits (that can be accomodated with 2N bits),
rjA|X is a string with an expected size of E
[∣∣rjA|X∣∣] = qXN bits and |sZ′ | = ∑nqj=1∣∣rjA|Z∣∣, where E[∣∣rjA|Z∣∣] = qZN
bits for all j = 1, . . . , nq. The size of the syndrome |sy(sB)| depends on the EC protocol (and a typical model is
given in the Discussion of the main text), |hEV(sB)| = dlog2(2/ˆcor)e bits, |hEV description| = 2dlog2(2/ˆcor)e bits
and |hPA description| = Mnq + l− 1 bits, l denoting the extractable key length, given by Eq. (F3) (Eq. (F5)) within
the AC, AN and PC corruption models (PN corruption model) for the QKD modules.
5. Calculation of N and Etol for the simulations
Here, we give adequate values for the number N of signals transmitted per QKDAj , j = 1, . . . , nq, and for the
threshold bit error rate of the EC protocol, Etol, based on respective restrictions on the abortion probabilities of the
sifting step and the error verification step. The analysis relies on a typical channel model described in Sec. F 6.
a. N
Let us impose a common abortion probability γsift/nq for each sifting step (nq of them in total). That is, we demand
that P (|Zj | < M) ≤ γsift/nq for all j = 1, . . . , nq, where |Zj | is the set of detection events in which both parties use
basis Z and M is the pre-specified size of the sifted keys (i.e., the block size). Using the Chernoff’s inequality [46],
this condition is met if we set the number of signals transmitted per QKDAj to N = ζ(M,
∑
aG
a
Z,Z, γsift/nq), where
ζ(x, y, z) is defined in Eq. (E35) and
∑
aG
a
Z,Z is the probability that any given round contributes to Zj (see Sec. F 6).
b. Etol
Following the BB84 protocol of Sec. F 1, EC is applied separately on each pair of sifted keys (sjA, s
j
B). Assuming, for
simplicity, that the EC protocol certainly corrects up to a fraction Etol of bit errors (and no more), either Ej ≤ Etol
for all j or the (single) EV step aborts, where Ej denotes the actual error rate between s
j
A and s
j
B. Thus, applying
Chernoff’s inequality [46], P (EV aborts) ≤ γEC holds for any γEC ∈ (0, 1) if
Etol = min
{
1, EZ +
∆U(EZM,γEC/nq)
M
}
(F13)
where EZ is the expected bit error rate for the basis Z, i.e., EZ = E[Ej ], and the deviation function ∆U(x, y) is
defined in Eq. (E25). An expression of EZ for a typical channel model is given in Sec. F 6.
6. Channel model
For the simulations, we adapt the typical channel model presented in Sec. E 6 to the decoy-state BB84 setup
illustrated in Fig. 5.
Most of the notation is common with Sec. E 6: ηdet denotes the detector efficiency and ηch = 10
−αattL denotes the
transmission efficiency, αatt (dB/km) being the attenuation coefficient and L (km) being the transmission distance
between Alice and Bob. Similarly, pd stands for the dark count probability of the photo-detectors and δA stands for
the polarization misalignment occurring in the channel. In this setup, the relevant experimental parameters are the
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FIG. 5: Schematic of the decoy-state BB84 setup. Alice holds a laser source that emits PR-WCPs in any of the four
BB84 states, defined by a polarization setting i ∈ {1, 2} and a basis setting θA ∈ {0, pi/4}. An intensity modulator
(IM) selects the amplitude |α| of Alice’s laser pulse. The overall efficiency of the system is denoted by η = ηchηdet,
where ηdet is the detector efficiency (set to a common value for both photo-detectors) and ηch = 10
−αL/10 is the
transmission efficiency, α (dB/km) being the attenuation coefficient of the channel and L (km) being the
transmission length. The angle δA ≥ 0 denotes the polarization misalignment occurring in the channel. On the other
hand, Bob holds a detection system that consists of a polarization modulator (POL), a polarizing beam-splitter
(PBS) denoted by the symbol “⊕”, and two single-photon detectors. POL selects Bob’s measurement setting,
θB ∈ {0, pi/4}, and the corresponding outcome is recorded in j ∈ {1, 2, ∅}. Precisely, Bob sets j = 1 (j = 2) if a click
is observed in the detector that detects the horizontal (vertical) component of the incoming pulse and j = ∅ if no
click is observed. If both detectors click, the outcome is randomly assigned to j = 1 or j = 2.
detection probability and the probability of having a bit error with amplitude |α|, given that both parties selected
the same measurement setting (i.e., Z or X). We denote these parameters by Qα and Eα, respectively, and they are
basis-independent in the considered channel model. In particular, explicit calculation of Qα and Eα using this model
yields
Qα = 1− (1− pd)2e−η|α|2 ,
QαEα =
p2d
2
+ pd(1− pd)
(
1 + hη,α,δA
)
+ (1− pd)2
(
1
2
+ hη,α,δA −
1
2
e−η|α|
2
)
(F14)
where η = ηdetηch and we defined hη,α,δA =
(
e−η|α|
2 cos2(δA) − e−η|α|2 sin2(δA))/2. These expressions account for the
fact that multiple clicks are randomly assigned to a specific detection outcome (see the caption of Fig. 5 for more
details).
Finally, we write down the expected values of the observables required for the simulations. For this purpose, we
introduce the quantities GaZ,Z = q
2
ZpaQ
√
a, GaX,X = q
2
XpaQ
√
a, Eˆa = E
√
a where a ∈ A and pa is the probability that
Alice uses the intensity setting a. From these quantities, it follows that
E
[∣∣Z ′aj |] = GaZ,Z∑
aG
a
Z,Z
M,
E
[∣∣X aj ∣∣] = GaX,XN, and
E
[
eja
]
= EˆaGaX,XN, (F15)
where we recall that N is the number of signals transmitted per QKD pair and M is the size of each sifted key. Also
note that, for each j = 1, . . . , nq all three sets Z ′aj contribute to the j-th sifted key. Thus, averaging over all three
intensity settings, the expected QBER in the basis Z is
EZ =
∑
a Eˆ
aGaZ,Z∑
aG
a
Z,Z
. (F16)
Remarkably, the formula above corresponds to the a priori expected bit error rate between any pair of sifted keys,
i.e., the expected error rate without using the knowledge of the actual set sizes
∣∣Z ′aj ∣∣. The knowledge of the set sizes
indeed provides slightly more accurate values of the expected bit error rates, but these would be different for each j.
Thus, for simplicity, we use the common a priori expected bit error rate for all j.
7. Performance evaluation
In Fig. 6, we plot the secret key rate that one can extract combining Protocol with the decoy-state QKD scheme
presented in Sec. F 1 of this Supplementary Information, as a function of the channel loss between Alice and Bob.
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Both the security and the experimental parameters are set following the criteria described in Sec. III of the main text.
That is, they are common with the simulations of MDI-QKD presented in Fig. 2 of the main text. As in that figure,
two different block sizes are considered, (a) M = 105 and (b) M = 106, and various distinct adversarial scenarios are
included. The reader is referred to Sec. III of the main text for a discussion of the results presented in Fig. 6 (such
discussion is common with that of Fig. 2 in the main text).
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FIG. 6: Secret key rate, K, that results from the decoy-state BB84 protocol with redundant devices presented in
Sec. F 1 of this Supplementary Information. Two distinct block-sizes are considered, (a) M = 105 and (b) M = 106.
In each case, K is plotted as a function of the channel loss between Alice and Bob for various adversarial scenarios
with malicious devices. In both figures, the purple line is the secret key rate in the standard scenario where each
party holds a trusted QKD module and a trusted classical post-processing (CP) unit. On the contrary, green lines
are used for different adversarial scenarios. Precisely, the dashed-dotted phosphorescent line is the secret key rate
assuming that the corrupted devices are passive and non-collaborative, which requires the use of two QKD pairs and
two CP units per lab (all of them being possibly malicious) to provide security. Meanwhile, the solid
non-phosphorescent green lines assume active and collaborative corrupted devices. These latter lines further assume
the same number, say t, of malicious QKD pairs and malicious CP units per lab, which requires the use of at least
nq = t+ 1 QKD pairs and nc = 3t+ 1 CP units per party to provide security. Specifically, the dark (light) green line
corresponds to t = 3 (t = 5).
Appendix G: Inverse Chernoff bound
Here, we rephrase the statement of the inverse Chernoff-bound presented in [51, 52].
Let X1, . . . , XN be independent Bernouilli random variables such that P [Xi = 1] = pi, and let X =
∑N
i=1Xi and
µ = E[X] =
∑N
i=1 pi, where E[·] denotes the expected value. Let x be the observed outcome of X for a given trial
(that is, x ∈ N). Then, x satisfies
x = µ+ δ (G1)
except with probability at most L + U, where the parameter δ ∈
[
−∆(x, L), ∆ˆ(x, U)
]
and
∆ˆ(x, y) = x
[
W0(−e−cx,y ) + 1
]
,
∆(x, y) =
{ −x [W−1(−e−cx,y ) + 1] if x 6= 0,
ln y−1 if x = 0.
(G2)
Here, Wj stands for the j-th branch of the W Lambert function and cx,y is defined as cx,y = 1 + ln y
−1/x. Also, L
and U are the one-sided error probabilities.
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Appendix H: Generalised chain rule for conditional smooth min-entropies
The first chain rule for conditional smooth min-entropies given in [40] can be restated as follows: for all ′2, 1 ≥ 0,
2 > 2
′
2 + 1,
H2min(Z2Z1|E) ≥ H
′
2
min(Z2|Z1E) +H1min(Z1|E)− log2
(
1
2 − 2′2 − 1
)
. (H1)
Using mathematical induction, the previous claim is easily generalised to
Hnmin(Zn . . . Z1|E) ≥
n∑
j=2
[
H
′j
min(Zj |Zj−1 . . . Z1E)− log2
(
1
j − 2′j − j−1
)]
+H1min(Z1|E), (H2)
for all j , 
′
j such that
1 ≥ 0,
{
′j ≥ 0, j > 2′j + j−1
}n
j=2
(H3)
and n ≥ 2. We prove it in what follows. First, the case n = 2 trivially holds, as it reduces to Eq. (H1). Let us now
assume that the proposition holds for a specific n = m larger than two and consider the case n = m+ 1. Again, from
Eq. (H1)
H
m+1
min (Zm+1 . . . Z1|E) ≥ H
′m+1
min (Zm+1|Zm . . . Z1E) +Hmmin(Zm . . . Z1|E)− log2
(
1
m+1 − 2′m+1 − m
)
, (H4)
for all ′m+1, m ≥ 0, m+1 > 2′m+1 + m. Note that the above equation is simply a recasting of Eq. (H1). Precisely,
Z2 and Z1 in the left-hand side of Eq. (H1) are respectively replaced by Zm+1 and the multivariable Zm . . . Z1.
The second term in the right-hand side of Eq. (H4) can be lower-bounded using the induction hypothesis and the
proposition for n = m+ 1 follows, which completes the proof.
In what follows, we deduce a restricted version of Eq. (H2) that can be applied in the derivation of the extractable
key length with passive non-collaborative eavesdroppers. Precisely, let us assume the following simplifications:
1. For j = 2, . . . , n, H
′j
min(Zj |Zj−1 . . . Z1E) = H
′j
min(Zj |E) for all ′j .
2. H1min(Z1|E) = 0 for all 1.
3. 1 = 0 and j = j−1 + 2′j + δ for j = 2, . . . , n and δ > 0.
4. ′j = ε for j = 2, . . . , n and ε > 0.
Note that assumptions 3 and 4 are such that the conditions given in Eq. (H3) trivially hold and n = (n− 1)(2ε+ δ).
From 1 to 4, Eq. (H2) easily reduces to
H
(n−1)(2ε+δ)
min (Zn . . . Z1|E) ≥
n∑
j=2
Hεmin(Zj |E)− log2
(
1
δn−1
)
, (H5)
with ε, δ > 0 and n ≥ 2.
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